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1In the years before Saddam Hussein co-opted pes-
ticide production facilities in Iraq to produce chemical 
 weapons, the world’s inspection and verification regimes 
were designed to govern large-scale chemical manufacturing 
facilities, which were primarily located in a few regions of 
the globe. Globalization has reduced the efficacy of the cur-
rent inspection regimes and opened verification gaps through 
the proliferation of chemical manufacturing equipment 
and infrastructure. To better understand the movement and 
tracking of chemical manufacturing equipment of dual-use2 
concern, the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts 
for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) at 
the Naval Postgraduate School contracted with the Board 
on Chemical Sciences and Technology (BCST) of the 
National Research Council (NRC) to hold a day-and-a-half 
workshop on the global movement and tracking of chemical 
manufacturing equipment. The workshop, held May 12-13, 
2014, in  Washington, DC, looked at key concerns regarding 
the availability and movement of equipment for chemi-
cal manufacturing, particularly used and decommissioned 
equipment that is of potential dual-use concern. Though the 
original statement of task called for an examination of future 
technology, discussions among the planning committee (see 
Appendix C for planning committee biographies) along with 
input received from the stakeholder community during the 
planning phase made it clear that there were some funda-
1The planning committee’s role was limited to planning the workshop, 
and the workshop summary has been prepared by the workshop rapporteur 
as a factual summary of what occurred at the workshop. Statements, recom-
mendations, and opinions expressed are those of individual presenters and 
participants, and are not necessarily endorsed or verified by the NRC, and 
they should not be construed as reflecting any group consensus.
2Dual-use items are generally defined as those that have both civilian 
and military applications.
mental questions regarding current technology and controls 
that required more discussion than originally anticipated. 
Thus, the focus of the workshop shifted slightly, primarily to 
address current rather than emerging concerns. In addressing 
these concerns, the workshop examined today’s industrial, 
security, and political contexts in which these materials are 
being produced, regulated, and transferred. The workshop 
also facilitated discussions about current practices, including 
consideration of their congruence with current technologies 
and security threats in the global chemical industrial system. 
The full statement of task can be found in Appendix A.
CONTEXT FOR THE WORKSHOP
Dual-use applications for chemical manufacturing equip-
ment have been recognized as a concern for many years, 
and export-control regulations worldwide are in place as a 
result. These regulations, in conjunction with the verification 
and inspection requirements of Article VI of the  Chemical 
 Weapons Convention (CWC), are designed to support non-
proliferation of manufacturing equipment suitable for produc-
tion of chemical warfare agents. In recent years, globalization 
has changed the distribution of chemical manufacturing 
facilities around the world. This has increased the burden 
on current inspection regimes, and increased the amount 
of manufacturing equipment available around the world. 
Movement of that equipment, both domestically and as part 
of international trade, has increased to accommodate these 
market shifts. 
Challenges for Direct Inspection of Production
Since World War I, when industrial dye manufacturing 
facilities were adapted to produce many of the chemical 
warfare agents released on the battlefields of Europe, poten-
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
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tial dual-use applications for chemical equipment have been 
recognized. Reactors, piping, pressure vessels, and other 
such basic manufacturing equipment, though requiring some 
specialization for the production of reactive chemical agents, 
can be adapted and used in processes for the manufacture 
of chemicals of concern by state or non-state actors. It is 
this concern that supports the inspection and verification 
requirements called for under Article VI of the CWC and that 
underlies some of the policies restricting the movement of 
manufacturing materials and equipment, such as U.S. export 
control regulations on manufacturing equipment, and more 
broadly, the agreements of the Australia Group.3
Many of the current inspection and verification regimes 
were developed during a time when large-scale chemical 
manufacturing facilities, including those for specialty chemi-
cals, were largely located within developed countries, which 
is also where the companies responsible for manufacturing 
the equipment were based. Initially, the CWC inspection 
and verification regime covered facilities known to produce 
chemicals listed in the treaty’s schedules, but this changed 
in the early 1990s in the wake of the revelation that Saddam 
Hussein had co-opted pesticide production facilities in Iraq 
to produce chemical weapons agents. After that “verifica-
tion gap” was identified, a requirement was developed that 
instructs signatories to the treaty to declare the presence of 
Other Chemical Production Facilities4 (OCPFs) within their 
countries and states that these facilities may be subject to 
inspection. However, to provide a sense of scale to the chal-
lenges faced by the organization, in late 2008 it was reported 
that approximately 500 OCPFs had undergone inspection. 
(Matthews, 2008) That same year, the Director-General of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW, 2008) stated:
The layout, design, and characteristics of plant sites are under 
continued review by industry. Very importantly, globalization 
is bringing about a massive redistribution and regional migra-
tion of chemical production and trade in the world.
In parallel with these movements, there has been an expo-
nential growth in the number of declared OCPFs. Today, the 
figure is rising in the order of 4,500 to 5,000, depending on 
the year. Due to their technological features (such as multi-
3The Australia Group is an informal forum of countries which, through 
the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do 
not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. 
Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group 
participants to fulfill their obligations under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest 
extent possible.
4Under the CWC, OCPFs are defined as facilities that “(a) produced 
by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of 
unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (DOCs); or (b) comprise one or 
more plants which produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year 
more than 30 tonnes of a DOC containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur 
or fluorine (PSF chemicals)” (OPCW, 2005).
purpose process equipment and flexible piping), a number of 
OCPFs could easily and quickly be re-configured for the pro-
duction of chemical weapons and are thus highly relevant to 
the object and purpose of the Convention. This is all the more 
pertinent in view of the evolving threat posed by terrorism.
In light of these numbers, it becomes clear that direct moni-
toring of a significant portion of worldwide production facili-
ties for potential production of chemical weapons agents is 
challenging.
With the limitations of direct inspection and verification 
of facilities, indirect controls in support of non-proliferation, 
such as export controls, play a critical role in reducing avail-
able production capacity. The restriction and monitoring 
of the flow of the chemical manufacturing equipment is 
intended to support non-proliferation by preventing special-
ized equipment, such as reactors and piping with specific 
corrosion-resistant coatings, from entering countries where 
concerns about either state or non-state actors exist.
Monitoring for Movement of Equipment
Monitoring of equipment movement, stockpiling, and 
acquisition has been used for decades to monitor produc-
tion of enriched nuclear materials, such as highly enriched 
uranium, that can be used for the production of nuclear 
weapons. Aluminum fuel rods used in uranium enrichment 
centrifuges, for example, have been a long-used, tell-tale 
sign of production of weapons-grade uranium by state actors. 
In the United States, utilization of the information derived 
from these types of movements in countries from Pakistan 
and North Korea to Iraq and Iran has allowed the govern-
ment to make critical policy decisions, most notably around 
counter-proliferation policy. In many ways, production of 
weapons-grade nuclear materials requires a relatively well 
known set of procedures and equipment that can be identified 
as potential threats.
Within the chemical manufacturing world, however, 
regulators act to place controls and restrictions on access to 
bulk-scale equipment without inhibiting the availability of 
this equipment to individuals pursuing legitimate commercial 
products. In the nuclear arena, the equipment being tracked 
or controlled is often highly specialized, which is not the case 
for chemical manufacturing. Within the United States and 
globally, equipment with features such as specialized coatings 
to resist corrosion or dual-walled piping—both of which are 
needed to produce chemical weapons on a large scale—
are subject to export controls with the goal of restricting 
sale and ownership of such equipment to legitimate, verified 
buyers. As noted in the introduction to this section, however, 
many of these requirements were initially developed when 
chemical manufacturing was largely based in the developed 
world, and globalization has resulted in a significant change 
in the distribution of manufacturing facilities worldwide.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
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This equipment is easiest to control when it is first 
manufactured. Pristine reactors, for example, can be built 
and shipped to a specific facility or company owner for its 
first use. Changes in production may require equipment to 
be modified, however, and in such cases, when a facility or 
unit is being decommissioned, companies have four common 
methods for handling the manufacturing equipment:
•	 Movement to another production facility or unit 
within the company,
•	 Sale of the equipment to another company with a 
similar product or production line,
•	 Sending the equipment to auction, or
•	 Scrapping the equipment.
At these times, though companies are governed by inter-
national law and the laws of their home countries, local 
capacity and regulation for managing decommissioned 
equipment vary. A large, experienced auction company 
specializing in manufacturing equipment in Europe, for 
example, will likely have a greater ability to adhere to 
requirements for verification of final ownership than a local 
auction house in a developing country.
The Impact of Globalization
Adding to the challenge of monitoring equipment, chemi-
cal manufacturing has become a global endeavor over the 
past two decades, with the fastest growth occurring in Asia. 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the rapid change in production growth 
in the chemical industry since 2002. As a result of these 
changes, a number of specific challenges to equipment track-
ing can be identified, examples of which include:
•	 Increased local capacity for production of manufac-
turing equipment worldwide;
•	 Increased movement of equipment within any given 
country;
•	 Rapid economic growth leading to rapid changes 
in the status of facilities, both in terms of company 
ownership and in the needs of the facilities; and
•	 Decommissioning of facilities in areas where produc-
tion has become less profitable.
Taken together, these changes are likely to increase the 
availability and movement of both general and specialized 
chemical manufacturing equipment globally, especially 
in economically emerging regions, and adapting to these 
changes will be necessary to ensure that such equipment 
remains out of the hands of individuals wishing to cause 
harm.
Addressing these challenges will require a multi-
disciplinary approach, requiring input from individuals with 
knowledge of chemistry and chemical engineering, experts 
in policy and non-proliferation, and input from the chemical 
industry. Such changes are likely to continue as the world 
economy grows, especially with expected advances in 
chemical production processes.5 Identifying potential future 
gaps or areas of concern in the tracking and monitoring 
processes and possible methods for addressing them would 
be beneficial.
5Examples of anticipated changes in the coming years include increased 
use of biological materials to produce chemicals and increased availability 
and functionality of microreactors.
FIGURE 1-1 International comparison of chemical production growth. 
SOURCE: CEFIC Chemdata International, 2013, and CEFIC analysis.
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ORGANIZATION OF THE SUMMARY
This publication summarizes the presentations and dis-
cussions that occurred at the workshop (see Appendix B 
for the workshop agenda), highlighting the key lessons pre-
sented and the resulting discussions among the workshop 
participants (see Appendix D for a list of attendees). 
Chapter 2 discusses the global landscape for chemical 
manufacturing equipment and Chapter 3 examines issues 
related to the lifetime of chemical manufacturing equip-
ment. Chapter 4 recounts the presentations and discussions 
on security  matters and Chapter 5 looks at the challenges 
associated with the Internet as a secondary market for used 
chemical manufacturing equipment. A  recurring sentiment 
from the presentations and resulting discussions was the 
sense that many companies in the United States and Europe 
have strong corporate cultures that understand the need for 
export prohibitions and that promote adherence to existing 
regulations. The main challenge to non-proliferation comes 
from the globalization of the chemical industry and the need 
to help those countries that have only recently built chemi-
cal production capabilities develop the knowledge of and 
expertise to meet the obligations spelled out in these treaties 
and national regulations. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the group discussion that examined 
a set of questions that were provided to the workshop par-
ticipants prior to the meeting. This discussion stressed the 
importance of developing strong partnerships both among 
companies in the chemical industry and between industry 
and government. 
In accordance with the policies of the NRC, the workshop 
did not attempt to establish any conclusions or recommenda-
tions about needs and future directions, focusing instead on 
issues identified by the  speakers and workshop participants. 
In addition, the organizing committee’s role was limited to 
planning the workshop. The workshop summary has been 
prepared by workshop rapporteurs Kathryn Hughes and 
Joe Alper as a factual summary of what occurred at the 
workshop.
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KEY POINTS
•	 The globalization of the chemical industry, and 
particularly its growth in Asia and Latin America, 
combined with changes in the technologies used 
to produce chemicals represent major challenges 
for tracking chemical manufacturing equipment. 
(Maennig)
•	 The number of math, science, and technology gradu-
ates produced by China and other countries outside 
of the United States and Europe portends a future in 
which the knowledge needed to produce and utilize 
chemical manufacturing equipment will be more 
broadly distributed globally. (Maennig)
•	 Increasing automation of chemical manufacturing, 
a trend of building smaller chemical production 
facilities, and the use of biotechnology in chemical 
manufacturing create challenges and opportunities 
for chemical weapons inspectors. (Maenning)
•	 The worldwide proliferation of regulations and 
international agreements pertaining to chemicals 
and chemical manufacturing equipment makes it 
difficult for even well-meaning companies to be in 
full compliance. (Maennig)
In the workshop’s opening session, Detlef Maennig, an 
industrial chemist with Evonik Industries representing the 
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), noted that 
the chemical industry has changed dramatically over the past 
20 years in a way that has gone largely unnoticed by the 
general public. These changes include a shift in the regions 
where the chemical industry is active and in its product mix 
as well as the development of new regulations, international 
cooperative groups and trade alliances, information tech-
nologies that more rapidly disseminate technological know-
2
The Changing Global Landscape
how, and new chemical production technologies, such as 
biological reactors and microreactors. 
The globalization of the chemical industry, and in par-
ticular the rapid growth of the industry outside of the United 
States and Europe, increases the challenges of monitoring the 
movement and use of chemical manufacturing equipment. 
One example of this challenge is that locally owned chemical 
companies in new chemical producing regions may not be 
aware of the responsibilities under the CWC. They may also 
lack the internal compliance programs and standards that are 
applied in regions with an established chemical industry. In 
addition, the globalization of the chemical industry has cre-
ated a large pool of people with expertise in the production 
of dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment who may not 
be aware of the provisions of the CWC.
Before addressing these changes, Maennig provided some 
background information on CEFIC, which represents 
some 29,000 chemical companies spread across Europe. 
About 600 of these companies are direct members of CEFIC 
with the rest being represented via their membership in one 
of the 28 member national chemical federations. In addi-
tion, there are 30 companies with associate membership that 
have operations in Europe but have headquarters elsewhere. 
CEFIC operates 104 different sector groups with about 4,500 
industry experts participating in these groups. 
Returning to the subject of change, Maennig noted that 
the number of state parties that have declared that they 
have chemical manufacturing facilities rose dramatically 
between 2001 and 2010, with the largest increase in company 
numbers occurring in Asia and Latin America. At the same 
time, global output of chemicals more than doubled (Fig-
ure 2-1) and China and the rest of Asia have both surpassed 
Europe as the leading manufacturers of chemicals. “It used 
to be that 30 percent of the world’s chemicals came from 
Europe and 27.7 percent came from North America,” said 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
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FIGURE 2-1 World chemicals output more than doubles as emerging market sales surge.
SOURCE: CEFIC Chemdata International, 2013. 
Maennig. Today, he noted, the European Union accounts 
for only 17.8 percent of chemical sales and North America’s 
market share has dropped to 16.8 percent (CEFIC, 2014). 
According to 2012 sales figures, Asian chemical production 
is now higher than that of Europe plus North America. In 
fact, China’s sales alone, which total €952 billion in 2012, 
are almost equal to those of Europe plus North America, at 
€558 billion and €526 billion respectively. To put these fig-
ures in context, Maennig said that Europe’s chemical sales 
have almost doubled since 1992 while its market share is 
half of what it was 20 years ago. Yet despite losing market 
share, Europe is still the world’s leading regions in terms of 
chemical exports, accounting for 41.6 percent of the world 
total. Seven member states, led by Germany, France, and The 
Netherlands, account for 85 percent of the European Union’s 
chemical sales. 
One change that Maennig noted as important for the 
future of the chemical industry was that the number of math, 
science, and technology graduates produced by China has 
soared since 2000 and now surpasses those from Europe 
and the United States combined. “So we need to be aware 
that China will not only be what we like to refer to as the 
world’s chemical workbench, but it will also be a significant 
contributor to worldwide intellectual property,” Maennig 
predicted. China also dominates today in terms of capital 
spending in the chemical industry, with €133.8 billion in 
capital investments compared to €24.7 billion in North 
America and €19 billion in Europe.
Another substantial change, said Maennig, has been the 
growth in the number of medium- and small-scale plants 
that specialize in producing high-value, high-profitability 
specialty chemicals, in contrast to the world-scale facili-
ties that produce bulk petrochemicals, chlorine-based 
chemicals, and fertilizers. “You see this with all of the big 
players. They are all trying to move more into higher value, 
value-added products, and away from bulk chemicals,” said 
Maennig.
An important technological change that is sweeping the 
chemical industry involves an increasing level of informa-
tion technology integration. “You don’t see chemical plants 
anymore that do not run without a distributed control system 
that is state of the art,” said Maennig. The acts of adding 
chemicals to reactors by hand or manually turning valves 
are largely relics of an earlier time, he added. For chemical 
weapons inspectors, this change means that they have to be 
aware that they cannot measure inputs and outputs by buckets 
and valves. On the other hand, production data should all be 
available from the distributed control systems.
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Biotechnology is another significant development for the 
chemical industry. Maennig said current estimates suggest 
that by 2020, some 10 percent of global chemical output 
will be the result of biotechnological processes rather than 
traditional petrochemical-based processes. He said that he 
expects that this development will have a significant impact 
on chemical weapons inspections. 
The regulatory landscape for the chemical industry has 
changed significantly over the past several decades, particu-
larly with regard to export controls for chemicals and chemi-
cal manufacturing equipment. There are now regulations 
governing persistent organic pollutants, ozone  depletion, 
narcotics production, psychotropic substances, money 
laundering, and terror financing in addition to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) that is most germane to this 
workshop. There are also other international agreements, 
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group, and the Australia Group, and a wide landscape 
of voluntary warning lists, sanctions, and embargoes that 
individual governments issue. The United States, explained 
Maennig, has special re-export regulations that companies 
need to consider as well. “It is very easy to overlook a regu-
lation,” said Maennig. “You need to be very careful and try 
to follow the regulations as best you can.” He suggested, in 
fact, that the subject of regulation would make a good future 
topic of discussion.
The chemical industry’s focus over the past decade has 
also shifted from one of products to one of developing solu-
tions to challenges, said Maennig. The result of this change in 
focus is that chemical companies are getting more involved 
with equipment manufacturers and forging new alliances 
with energy companies. This move, he explained, is related 
to sustainability. “When we look into the future, there will 
be nine billion people on the planet by 2050, so the chemical 
industry is looking at how it can guarantee that there will be 
enough food, enough water,” said Maennig. In addition, the 
world is urbanizing rapidly, and he estimated that 67 percent 
of the world’s population will live in cities, creating a tremen-
dous demand on infrastructure, water, energy, and traffic. In 
terms of energy, the chemical industry has been aggressive 
about developing chemical production technologies that use 
less energy and is working with other interested partners to 
provide solutions to these problems.
The final change that Maennig highlighted was the reduc-
tion in the time that companies have to bring products to 
the market than they did in past decades. Joint development 
of products now seems to be a critical part of the chemical 
industry. So, too, is life-cycle analysis. Maennig highlighted 
this change by noting that chemists are creating some 12,000 
new substances each day.1
Turning to the subject of the CWC, which has been in 
force since 1997, Maennig said that what has been hap-
pening in Syria argues that the Convention will not stop all 
production of chemical weapons. One sign of that reality 
is that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) has built up its capacity to handle and 
destroy chemical weapons. What is needed going forward, 
said Maennig, is better communication between OPCW 
and the chemical industry. “In the beginning phases of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, there was an intense inter-
action between the chemical industry and the OPCW. But 
since it has worked so well, there has been less momentum 
to maintain that part of the dialogue. Now that we see how 
the international framework is changing, how the security 
framework is changing, there should be enhanced interaction 
between the chemical industry and the OPCW,” Maennig 
said in closing his comments.
DISCUSSION
In response to a question from Charles Mooney of Xylem, 
Inc., about the rise of China as a chemical producer, Maennig 
explained that China got into the field mostly as a producer 
of bulk drugs and commodities but that bulk production 
continues in other parts of the world because local produc-
tion reduces transportation costs and concerns. He noted 
that China’s chemical industry initially benefited from lower 
production costs arising from fewer safety and environmental 
controls compared to those in place in Europe and North 
America. China, however, is using more sophisticated pro-
duction techniques to address pollution and safety issues. 
Maennig estimated that within 5-10 years that there will not 
be much of a difference in the type of chemistry being done 
in China in comparison to Europe and North America. 
Nancy Jackson, from the Department of State, asked 
about shifts in worldwide investment in chemical research, in 
contrast to capital investment. Maennig said that investment 
in research in China and some of the other rapidly develop-
ing countries is still relatively low, particularly in terms of 
foreign investment. 
REFERENCE
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The workshop’s second session featured four speakers 
who discussed examples of how different companies deal 
with their chemical manufacturing equipment in the context 
of a changing industry and the restrictions of what can be 
done with it after its initial owner has no further use for 
it. Charles Mooney, Director of Global Trade Compliance 
at Xylem, spoke about his experience in exporting chemi-
cal equipment export. Ye Shao, Manager of International 
Relations for the Morimatsu Group, discussed China’s per-
spective on international trade of chemical manufacturing 
equipment. Ana Prieto, an independent consultant on global 
environmental, health, and safety functions, gave her per-
spective on how chemical manufacturing equipment is man-
aged in the field and how that relates to an important limita-
tion of current controls. J. Craig Desrosiers, Senior Buyer at 
E.I. du Pont Canada, described some of the different types 
of equipment used in chemical manufacturing. A discussion 
moderated by Clara Zahradnik, Export Control Leader for 
DuPont Chemicals & Fluoroproducts and a member of the 
workshop organizing committee, followed the presentations.
KEY POINTS
•	 There is tremendous variation in the way individual 
countries implement the many international provi-
sions dealing with chemical processing equipment. 
(Mooney)
•	 A combination of durable materials (Desrosiers) and 
the ingenuity of chemists and chemical engineers 
mean that chemical manufacturing equipment rarely 
dies, but rather is reconditioned or repurposed for other 
uses. This is particularly true for equipment used in the 
biotechnology and fermentation industries, where pro-
cess conditions are generally mild and non-abrasive, 
and for equipment that has no moving parts. (Mooney)
•	 There is a low barrier to entry into the chemical 
equipment manufacturing industry, with China 
being one example, where there are now some 3,000 
companies capable of building chemical production 
equipment. The only barriers to entry are access to 
capital and labor. (Shao) When coupled with the 
lack of regulations in many developing countries 
governing the sale and disposal of equipment within 
national borders, this expansion of equipment manu-
facturers increases the opportunities for the diversion 
of chemical manufacturing equipment. (Prieto)
•	 As the market for chemicals grows in the developing 
world, so too will the number of small- to mid-sized 
chemical equipment manufacturing companies. 
These companies will need to have a certain level of 
technical sophistication to make equipment for the 
U.S. and European export markets. (Shao)
•	 Three trends—industry consolidation, globalization, 
and an increasing focus on core competencies and the 
accompanying shift to contract manufacturing in the 
closely related pharmaceutical industry means that 
there is surplus chemical manufacturing equipment 
available and a developing global market seeking to 
purchase this equipment. (Prieto)
•	 The advent of online commercial marketplaces, such 
as eBay and others, increases the chances that surplus 
equipment will move across borders and become 
challenging to track. (Prieto)
•	 The increase in mergers and acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry can create gaps in inventory 
control and tracking of surplus equipment. (Prieto)
•	 Today’s export controls are linked to an expectation 
of practice that does not necessarily align with rapid 
changes that are taking place in the industrial land-
scape. As a result, export regulations were crafted 
3
The Lifetime of Manufacturing Equipment
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during a time when the concern was over nations 
using equipment for nefarious purposes may not be 
up to the task of controlling proliferation of chemi-
cal weapons capabilities in today’s world in which 
groups rather than counties are the main threat. 
(Prieto)
•	 Current regulatory schemes take a backward-looking 
approach to technology. Regulators could instead 
look ahead and try to devise approaches to respond 
to emerging technology. (Prieto)
•	 In addition to an expansion in the number of com-
panies globally that can produce chemical manu-
facturing equipment, there has been a concomitant 
growth in the number of firms that can produce the 
corrosion-resistant materials that are required to build 
long-lasting equipment. (Desrosiers)
•	 The time required for regulators to respond to requests 
for licenses and the need for speed and flexibility 
in industry can lead to tension as manu facturers 
endeavor to comply with global export and non-
proliferation regulations. However, strong corporate 
culture among established chemical companies makes 
it possible to maintain profitability alongside compli-
ance with regulatory requirements and “doing the 
right thing.” (Desrosiers, Mooney, Shao)
EXPERIENCES IN EXPORTING CHEMICAL 
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT
There are four pillars to export controls, said Charles 
Mooney. The first pillar concerns products and it requires 
knowing what the product is, what it will be used for, and 
what it is capable of being used for beyond its intended 
application. The second pillar deals with the end use of an 
item, that is, how the equipment is going to be used. “As 
chemical producers and manufacturers of equipment, one 
of our concerns is that our equipment is always used the 
way it is intended to be used or designed,” said Mooney. 
For example, his company makes heat exchangers that 
are subject to controls of the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) because of their intended use. Others are 
subject to controls of the Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR) because the materials used to make the equipment, 
which are specialized and enable its use in harsh chemical 
environments, are controlled.
The third and fourth pillars refer to the destination for the 
item and the end user at that destination. “The country is a 
concern, but this is more about who is using it in the country 
since countries don’t use equipment or chemicals—end users 
do,” explained Mooney. In the end, these four pillars all come 
down to a matter of trust, capability, and capacity, he said. 
“If your exporter does not have a program that is grounded in 
these elements…chances are there is going to be no control 
and there is going to be an issue,” Mooney stated.
Regarding international standards, Mooney said that 
the provisions for dealing with most chemical process-
ing equipment, particularly dual-use items, are found in 
the CWC, the Australia Group’s Common Control Lists, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, and to a lesser extent 
in the  Wassenaar Agreement and guidelines of the Nuclear 
 Suppliers Group. In particular, there is tremendous variation 
in the way individual countries implement these standards. 
Each country has its own control lists, even though they 
originate from the same multinational agreements. Japan’s 
list, for example, fills a thin book, while the U.S. Department 
of Commerce’s list takes up a very thick book, according to 
Mooney. Countries also differ in how they interpret these 
agreements and how often they update their control lists. 
For example, when his former company wanted to move 
mixers to new plant in China, it used a Japanese company 
to source the equipment because Japan, unlike the United 
States, did not require any licensing to move the mixers to 
China, enabling the mixers to be moved in 10 months. He 
noted that during a subsequent move of the same size and 
type of mixers from the U.S. to China, simply acquiring the 
licenses from the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security took 
approximately the same amount of time to obtain. “That 
doesn’t make it right, that doesn’t make it wrong,” said 
Mooney. “It is a business reality, though.”
Often, said Mooney, there are more than one set of con-
trols for the same transaction, and this can create difficulties, 
particularly when working in more than once country. “To 
comply with global standards, the exporter must consider 
the regulations of the local exporting company, and any 
extra-territorial controls,” he said. In Europe, for example, 
Germany and the United Kingdom have very rigorous 
export-control regimes, but other countries, such as Italy and 
Spain, have, as Mooney put it, “a different perception of what 
the regulations mean.” 
Mooney said that it is important to plan for the time that 
it takes to get all of the necessary licenses when planning 
to export equipment covered by any of the multinational 
agreements. In some cases, licenses can take just a few days 
or weeks to procure, but in other cases it can take many 
months of back and forth with regulators. One problem he 
sees with all of the regulations is that they largely depend on 
self-policing and honesty. While the United States may issue 
an export license with various provisos and logging require-
ments, keeping track of what happens to equipment after it 
has moved or been sold to others can be difficult at best. His 
advice to those individuals responsible for export controls 
is to err on the side of caution when seeking authorization 
to export equipment or materials that could have dual-use 
applications.
Turning to the subject of chemical equipment lifetime, 
Mooney quipped that chemical manufacturing equipment 
never dies, but rather it comes back to life in some other 
form with some other use because of the significant initial 
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investment that is made in these items. Multiple factors 
determine the lifetime of a piece of equipment, he explained, 
including the materials from which it is made, what it can 
be used to make, and if it was designed to be maintained 
over many years. He noted that he has seen mixers in use 
that were at least 50 years old, and added that much of this 
type of equipment, including reactors, have no moving parts 
to wear out. This is particularly true of equipment used in 
the bio technology or fermentation industries, where process 
conditions are generally mild and certainly not caustic or 
abrasive. Mooney also credited the chemical industry overall 
for its skill in creating new uses for old equipment. 
INDUSTRIAL REGULATIONS AND  
EQUIPMENT FABRICATION
From his perspective as a manufacturing representative 
for a company in China that builds chemical production 
equipment, Ye Shao said this business is not very sophisti-
cated and that it is easy to establish a new company to com-
pete in this market—China alone has some 3,000 companies 
capable of building chemical production equipment, and they 
are largely interchangeable in terms of their capabilities. 
Given that the competition is stiff, it should not be surpris-
ing that this is a difficult business to sustain. He noted that 
for his company, there are five major parts: raw materials, 
engineering, labor—the welders, inspectors, and engineers 
involved in building a piece of equipment—and infrastruc-
ture, which includes the large facilities at which equipment is 
put together. He also said that the equipment manufacturing 
business is become less rather than more integrated, with 
many companies now outsourcing engineering, inspection, 
and sometimes even assembly to outside shops in order to 
reduce costs and remain competitive.
The global market for mechanical fabrication equipment, 
said Shao, began in the United States and Europe in the 
1950s and it largely remained in those two markets until 
the 1970s. The industry then moved to Japan and Singapore 
in the 1970s and remained there for the remainder of the 
last century. Today, Korea, China, and the Middle East are 
major players in this industry, and Shao predicted that the 
industry will move to other developing countries, particularly 
within Africa, in the years ahead as the need for energy and 
chemicals grows in those markets.
Though it does not take much beyond capital to establish 
a manufacturing company, there are a number of standards 
that anyone competing in this field must meet in order to 
sell the equipment they produce. The oldest standard is the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, 
which was developed more than 100 years ago. Originally 
a national standard, the ASME Code has been adopted as a 
global standard followed by engineers worldwide. “ASME 
certificates are entry tickets for doing something in the global 
markets,” explained Shao. In May 2002, a new standard—
the European Union’s Pressure Equipment Directive—was 
enacted and made it legally compulsory for all fabricator 
shops to follow this directive if they want to sell their prod-
ucts in the European markets. China recently enacted its own 
standard, known as GB 150, that is equivalent to the ASME 
Section VII, Division 1 standard that provides requirements 
applicable to the design, fabrication, inspection, testing, and 
certification of pressure vessels operating at either internal 
or external pressures. Shao said that newly industrialized 
companies have to be certified according to these standards 
to do business in the United States, Europe, and China. 
One of the drivers for the development of standards is that 
standards make life simpler with regard to national regula-
tions, said Shao, and both the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) are trying to develop standards to guide this 
industry, such as a standard for fabricating pressure vessels 
and boilers. He noted, though, that during his 10 years in 
the industry he has yet to see a WTO or ISO standard being 
compulsory for any specific project.
Before discussing China’s perspective on this industry, 
Shao spoke briefly about the economics of chemical equip-
ment manufacturing. Using a $1 million stainless steel pres-
sure vessel as his example, he explained that 60 percent of 
that $1 million goes to purchase the raw materials, about 
35 percent is spent on labor costs, and the remaining 5 per-
cent pays for engineering. One unusual feature of chemical 
manufacturing equipment is that labor costs rise with the 
size of the equipment, giving countries with low labor costs 
a competitive advantage when it comes to building large 
pieces of equipment. However, some contracts specify that 
the bidder must obtain written approval of the buyer to use 
any materials or labor not originating in the United States, 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Spain, and Italy. Shao noted that companies in developed 
countries are competitive because they have a better under-
standing and application of the regulations germane to them, 
they tend to be more efficient, and because they have an accu-
mulated knowledge base that lends itself to better efficiency. 
In China, the growth of ASME certified manufacturing 
companies has soared since 2003. In 2003, 115 out of a 
global total of 4,492 companies (2.5%) held ASME cer-
tificates. By 2013, that number had risen to 747 certificate 
holders out of 6,894 (10.8%) worldwide. Shao noted that 
there are no more than 300 certificate holders in the United 
States. He also said that while the perception is that China 
is a low-cost solution for manufacturing, this is increas-
ingly not true. What has helped China expand its equipment 
manufacturing industry has been the rapid expansion of the 
market that has accompanied internationalization, China’s 
focus on large value-added projects that require sophistica-
tion but come with high rates of return, and recognition by 
global industries that China has the resources and skills to 
compete in this market. As global markets expand, he added, 
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there is an increasing demand for what he called “universal 
products” that meet the specifications spelled out in global, 
technology-driven regulations.
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD
As an introduction to her talk, Ana Prieto explained that 
she would be speaking from her perspective as an environ-
mental health and safety professional who spent much of her 
career in the pharmaceutical industry. She noted that in 2010, 
the world’s chemical industry realized an estimated turnover 
of roughly $3.12 trillion dollars, of which the United States 
accounted for approximately 21 percent. By segment, basic 
chemicals accounted for $250 billion of the U.S. chemical 
industry revenue, specialty chemicals totaled $126 billion, 
agricultural chemicals totaled $30.7 billion, and consumer 
products accounted for $71.5 billion of the total. Pharmaceu-
ticals represented the largest category, totaling $186 billion.
In brief review of the pharmaceutical sector, Prieto 
explained that there are two major components to the process 
of making a finished drug product, whether it is a tablet, oint-
ment, cream, or injectable. The first is the production of the 
active pharmaceutical agent itself and the second is formula-
tion, which is when the active pharmaceutical agent is mixed 
with other ingredients to produce the finished product. The 
major difference between the pharmaceutical industry and 
other segments of the chemical industry is scale, she said, 
but the equipment used to make pharmaceuticals—reactors, 
centrifuges, distillation columns, and others—is similar if 
not the same as that used in chemical manufacturing. Most 
pharmaceuticals, for example, are made in batch processes. 
Another aspect of the pharmaceutical industry is that there 
are three subsectors: original or “branded” pharmaceuticals, 
the products of “big pharma;” generics, which are copies 
of drugs whose patents have expired; and over-the-counter 
agents that have been deemed safe for self-medication and 
for which no prescription is required. 
What all of this has to do with the topic of this workshop, 
said Prieto, is that the pharmaceutical industry is experienc-
ing some of the same trends as the overall chemical industry. 
The first trend is consolidation, which reflects the growth 
potential for emerging markets, the expiration of patents, 
and the development of desirable new technologies. These 
technologies may be more lucrative to own and control by 
purchasing the company that developed them rather than 
merely licensing it from the developer. The second trend is 
globalization driven by cost efficiency, market opportunities, 
and economic development, and the third trend—the one that 
Prieto said is most germane to the issue of chemical manufac-
turing equipment—is a focus on core processes. Companies, 
she said, are trying to focus on what they do best, whether 
that be research and development, marketing, or manu-
facturing, and are turning more to contract organizations 
and partnerships to reduce costs of drug production. When 
undergoing these shifts in business models, companies may 
decommission or sell their chemical manufacturing facilities.
The impact of these three trends, said Prieto, is that there 
is both surplus manufacturing equipment available and a 
developing global market looking to purchase this equip-
ment. The advent of online marketplaces, such as eBay and 
others, makes it more likely that this surplus equipment 
will move across borders and become challenging to track. 
At the same time, the increase in mergers and acquisitions 
comes with the potential that the buyer of a company may 
not know what equipment it is purchasing as it may not be 
inventoried accurately. “There really are some potential gaps 
in the knowledge as to the equipment owned,” said Prieto. 
As an example, she described the time she went to visit 
a site in Croatia for a first-time visit to a company her firm 
had purchased. While touring the rather large facility, she 
and her hosts came across a building filled with chemical 
manufacturing equipment that had been dismantled, put into 
storage, and forgotten. “There was no inventory control or 
tracking of what was in place,” said Prieto. She noted that 
the gaps in this particular purchased company’s organization 
capacity that allowed this equipment to go uncatalogued is 
not that uncommon, particularly in smaller companies. With 
limited resources and systems, these smaller firms are plac-
ing increased reliance on service providers such as equip-
ment dealers, freight forwarders, and auctioneers, to manage 
their transactions. “If you are not careful how you choose 
that partner, you may unintentionally, with all the best ideas 
and thoughts, wind up not being able to track what you have 
and where,” said Prieto. 
Another issue that she discussed briefly was that while 
there are a great many export regulations in place, there are 
few controls over the sale and disposition of equipment that 
does not cross national borders. “Other than hazardous waste 
regulations that tell me what I can and cannot do if a material 
is a hazardous waste, I don’t believe in my experience that 
there have been any regulations around in-country movement 
of equipment,” said Prieto. She added that this is also true 
in some of the less developed nations that are building their 
own equipment manufacturing infrastructure for internal use. 
In closing, Prieto said that from her perspective, “manu-
facturing equipment is used in a broad variety of sectors and 
is easily available through a variety of ways. In reality, there 
are no or few mechanisms in place to identify and manage 
that equipment in an in-country transaction.” She added 
that the focus on core capabilities and economic drivers has 
increased the number of companies with access to chemical 
manufacturing equipment. “The complexity and the number 
of players who are now in this field and may not have the 
necessary knowledge are extensive,” said Prieto. She noted, 
too, that the export controls that are in place are linked to 
an expectation of practice that does not necessarily align 
with rapid changes that are taking place in the industrial 
landscape. As a result, she worries that while export regula-
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tions were crafted during a time when the concern was over 
nations using equipment for nefarious purposes, the reality 
of today’s world is that groups rather than counties are the 
main threat.
MATERIALS FOR EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING
In this session’s final presentation, J. Craig Desrosiers 
used DuPont’s equipment needs as a means of describing the 
specialized materials used to construct chemical manufactur-
ing equipment and their respective applications and durabil-
ity over time. He noted that DuPont’s seven major market 
segments uses a variety of items, such as heat exchangers, 
reactors, distillation columns, and pressure vessels, and that 
these items can be constructed using many different materials 
that include glass linings, fluoropolymer linings, hi-nickel 
alloys, and exotic metallurgies such as titanium and tantalum.
Glass-lined equipment is valued for its corrosion resis-
tance to all but a few chemical environments; its inert 
nature that does not contaminate products and protects their 
color and purity; its smoothness that minimizes friction and 
reduces demands on agitation equipment, and its superior 
performance under vacuum arise from the tight bond that 
forms between glass and steel. French company De Dietrich 
began making glass-lined equipment in 1870, and U.S. com-
pany Pfaudler launched its first glass-lined product in 1884. 
The two companies together still dominate the market and 
now have factories around the world. China, he said, now 
has as many as 30 factories making glass-lined equipment, 
though only a few can meet global quality requirements, 
and there are some smaller companies that specialize in re-
glassing used equipment. In the United States, surplus equip-
ment brokers are major supplies of glass-lined equipment. 
Typically, he explained, glass-lined equipment has a life-
time of longer than 20 years, but mechanical damage from 
maintenance or operations can lead to expensive repairs 
or re-glassing in 2 to 5 years. Accessories, such as agita-
tors, baffles, and other internal components, are replaced 
frequently—usually after 2 to 5 years. A National Board 
Number in the United States and a CE Number in Europe 
is associated with each piece of equipment on an attached 
nameplate and can be used for tracking purposes.
Fluoropolymer-lined equipment such as distillation 
columns, reactor vessels, scrubbers, tanks, and piping, is 
used in highly corrosive environments. There are several 
major players in this market sector and the market for 
 fluoropolymer-lined equipment has grown substantially 
over the past 20 years. Because of the need for the high-
est level of quality and inspection, the supply chain for 
 fluoropolymer-lined equipment often still starts in the United 
States. Desrosiers noted that the life cycle of this equipment 
has improved significantly over the past 20 years and track-
ing of this equipment can be handled easily using its National 
Board Number.
Equipment made with hi-nickel alloys and other exotic 
metals are used for their outstanding corrosion resistance 
under highly acidic, highly chlorinated, and high- temperature 
conditions. Many of the materials used in this type of equip-
ment are related to austenitic stainless steel but are more 
highly alloyed with nickel, chromium, and  molybdenum 
to increase corrosion resistance. Long life cycles are asso-
ciated with equipment made with these materials. Unlike 
with fluoropolymer-lined equipment, the supply chain for 
this type of equipment has expanded globally over the past 
20 years. Today, companies in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
and India are significant players in this market, Desrosiers 
said in closing.
DISCUSSION
Elizabeth Scott Sangine of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce began the discussion by asking the presenters if they 
had any perspective on how the business models of their 
respective companies viewed proliferation risks. Desrosiers 
replied that DuPont is concerned about where its technolo-
gies will go in certain countries, particularly those in which 
the government makes no secret of the fact that it will take 
whatever technology it wants regardless of contracts and 
regulations. “I am extremely concerned about how we man-
age that risk,” said Desrosiers. He did comment that while 
export controls are absolutely necessary, they sometimes are 
cumbersome and very costly to follow. Clara Zahradnik, the 
session moderator, added that a key consideration is to have 
trust in one’s trading partners, and given that many of the 
chemical weapons that are appealing to terrorist groups can 
be “made in washtubs,” it is equally as important to control 
chemicals as well as equipment.
Detlef Maennig asked if there was a tracking technol-
ogy in place for dual-use equipment and was reminded by 
Zahradnik of the National Board number or CE number that 
is affixed to each piece of equipment. Zahradnik did note, 
though, that often an export license is applied for and granted 
before a piece of equipment is produced and given an iden-
tifier number. Prieto wondered if it would be feasible to go 
back and assign tracking numbers to legacy equipment. This 
prompted Nancy Jackson, of the U.S. Department of State, to 
ask the panelists if they had any ideas on who would set up 
an international tracking system. Prieto replied that it may be 
possible to add provisions to existing regulations and treaties, 
but that she didn’t see a direct pathway. “I think the challenge 
will be keeping it somewhat simple,” said Prieto, especially 
given the multitude of regulations that exist outside of the 
United States and Europe. 
Kathryn Hughes of the NRC asked if there was an inter-
section among international regulations, export controls, 
voluntary standards, and corporate culture where it would 
be possible to create a system of protection that goes beyond 
compliance. Mooney said that one of the biggest drivers of 
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protection is corporate culture and most of the companies 
in the chemical industry have strong corporate cultures that 
have found ways to balance regulatory requirements and 
doing the right thing with profitability. He added that this 
is not a U.S. initiative, but rather a worldwide initiative that is 
following in the footsteps of U.S. companies that are already 
doing the right thing. 
Shao agreed that corporate culture is critical and added 
that from his perspective as a manufacturer, controlling 
technology is more important than controlling the actual 
equipment. Prieto suggested that trade associations and pro-
fessional organizations might be able to play a role in devel-
oping voluntary programs and disseminating the knowledge 
needed to understand and follow controls and regulations. 
Zahradnik said that large companies, which have the neces-
sary corporate cultures, can be ambassadors for following 
standards and adhering to best practices in their dealings with 
smaller companies and vendors. Usha Wright, of O’Brien & 
Gere and a member of the workshop organizing committee, 
asked if the transportation industry could play a role in terms 
of compliance and tracking, and Desrosiers thought it could 
act as a cross-checker but not as a primary enforcer. 
Astrid Lewis from the U.S. Department of State asked 
Shao if China had an equivalent to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology that develops the standards for 
various regulatory codes. Shao replied that China does have 
such an organization that does help set national standards and 
codes. He added that China largely models its standards after 
those of the United States, Europe, and Japan, and most often 
uses the ASME standards even when exporting to Europe. “If 
you want to do global sourcing, it is mandatory to have an 
understanding of the ASME standards,” said Shao. 
Hughes asked what was being missed given the rate of 
change globally. Desrosiers replied that there is a significant 
skill gap between the European Union, North America, and 
the rest of the world. “While I know the gap is trying to be 
closed, one of the things that I find when I procure equip-
ment outside of those regions, I have to spend significantly 
more in inspection to make sure the quality of the work is 
there, the quality of the material is there. While I think these 
countries are coming along nicely, there is still a significant 
gap between the experienced countries and the emerging 
countries,” said Desrosiers. Prieto thought that regulatory 
schemes are somewhat backward-focused given the rate of 
change. “We should be looking to what it is going to look 
like in another 10 years and try to devise regulations for that,” 
she said. Mooney said that the regulatory system needs to be 
more responsive in terms of time to approval. “We’ve got to 
find the right velocity,” he said. 
Mooney made two additional observations. One was 
that while the world of new equipment is well controlled, 
the Internet is changing the landscape with regard to used 
equipment. The second observation was that none of this 
is taught in schools and perhaps that needs to change, too. 
Richard Cupitt of the U.S. Department of State said that 
there are efforts ongoing to teach “responsible science” at 
the university level and that various educational organiza-
tions, both in the United States and Europe, are developing 
courses in that area. 
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The workshop’s third session focused on various aspects 
of security and chemical weapons production and featured 
presentations by four speakers. Jonathan Forman, Science 
Policy Advisor for the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), spoke on the topic of prevent-
ing chemical weapons proliferation. Matthew Moakler, 
Foreign Affairs Officer in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonprolifera-
tion and Chair of the interagency Shield Licensing Group, 
presented a policy perspective on dual-use chemical equip-
ment non-proliferation. Richard Cupitt, the U.S. Coordinator 
for United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1540 in the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives at the 
U.S. Department of State, then discussed implementation 
of UNSCR 1540, which addresses proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and illegal trafficking in 
these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The final presen-
tation by Elizabeth Scott Sangine, Director of the Chemical 
and Biological Controls Division at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, described the U.S. approach to chemical equip-
ment export controls. A discussion moderated by Nancy 
Jackson, Franklin Fellow at the U.S. Department of State and 
a member of the workshop organizing committee, followed 
the presentations.
KEY POINTS
•	 The role of non-state actors is a major challenge 
for non-proliferation activities, particularly since 
the control of those actors depends on individual 
nations enforcing international agreements and 
developing sufficient national-level controls to 
govern the use and transfer of chemical manufac-
turing equipment within their own borders. Addi-
tional challenges arise from non-state actors using 
less sophisticated technologies to make chemical 
 weapons. (Forman)
•	 Treaties are important as matters of principle, 
but they are only implemented to the degree that 
national-level laws that address criminal legislation, 
trade controls, and the reporting and monitoring of 
industry within the national boundaries are both 
developed to conform with treaty obligations and 
enforced. (Forman) As of 2011, fewer than half of the 
member nations of the United Nations had created a 
legal framework to account for the production, use, 
storage, or transport of chemical weapons-related 
materials, and even fewer countries had enforcement 
measures in place. (Cupitt) 
•	 Chemicals can be listed under the CWC, but there is 
a concern that new methods that avoid listed com-
pounds can be developed to create toxic chemicals 
or that novel delivery technologies, such as nano-
technology, can be used to turn an unlisted compound 
into a chemical weapon. (Forman) 
•	 Changing technology can create difficulties for 
inspectors trying to differentiate between a legitimate 
chemical plant and one making chemical weapons 
(Forman). 
•	 The ability to transfer information, DNA sequences 
for example, without the additional need to transfer 
material may present a future challenge for control-
ling dual-use materials. (Forman)
•	 The non-physical transfer of technology thanks 
to avenues such as the Internet is a major concern 
and can only be addressed through a combination 
of activities, such as promoting global norms and 
developing non-proliferation regimes that can link 
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•	 Sound export licensing decisions by suppliers and 
nations have had a tangible impact on proliferators 
by denying them access to the world’s best sources 
of technology and corrosion-resistant equipment. 
(Moakler)
•	 The trend for chemicals production to move to lower-
cost countries creates a challenge for the effective use 
of export controls because fewer chemical-producing 
nations are now part of the Australia Group. (Moakler)
•	 Information exchange between industry and regulators 
is critical for making regulations work and reducing 
the overall burden on industry. Applications for an 
export license should include information on the spe-
cific intended end use, as well as other potential uses; 
the intended destination; and what kind of relationship 
and for how long has the licensee had with the intended 
recipient company and its background. Volunteering 
such information takes a strong corporate culture that 
encourages this degree of sharing. (Sangine)
•	 Education, training, and outreach efforts have lagged 
behind other approaches to non-proliferation but are 
needed to help create a culture of support for non-
proliferation activities. (Sangine, Cupitt)
•	 There is little political will at the national level to 
increase the number of chemicals on control sched-
ules. (Cupitt, Maennig)
CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION
The OPCW is the implementing body for the CWC, 
the multilateral disarmament treaty for chemical weapons, 
explained Jonathan Forman. The OPCW is located in The 
Hague and has a staff of about 500 people—120 of which 
are chemical weapons inspectors—from 80 nations with an 
annual operating budget of about $101 million excluding the 
cost of the current disarmament activities in Syria, which are 
funded by voluntary contributions from the member states. 
There are 190 member states, all signatories to the CWC; 
all but Israel and Myanmar have also ratified the treaty. Four 
countries—Angola, North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan—
have not signed the treaty.
There are four core activities for OPCW: chemical dis-
armament, which includes the destruction of military chemi-
cal weapons stockpiles; non-proliferation, which includes 
verification; assistance with and protection against chemical 
weapons; and fostering international cooperation. Verifica-
tion, Forman explained, is a process by which the State’s 
 Parties declare the chemicals and chemical activities that 
they have going on in their territories, including industrial 
activities that meet certain criteria and that are subject to 
random inspection by a team of international inspectors. At 
military sites, verification entails having inspectors confirm 
that every chemical weapon and all related munitions are 
accounted for and destroyed. In some cases, the verifica-
tion process involves sampling and analysis, while in other 
instances it involves just looking around and checking 
records, said  Forman. At a higher level, verification includes 
looking at the national-level controls that the member states 
put into place. The goal of this process is to build confidence 
among nations that each signatory to the CWC is follow-
ing through with its obligations to comply with the treaty’s 
provisions. 
Treaties are great in principle, said Forman. “They say 
that this is what we believe in and this is what we are com-
mitted to,” he said. “But how do you actually implement the 
laws and regulations that make a treaty effective? That is 
what is done at the national level.” He explained that each 
nation is responsible for enacting the laws and regulations 
needed to meet the responsibilities obligated by the treaty. 
One limitation of this approach is that in today’s world, non-
state actors are a major worry and non-state actors are not 
covered directly by the treaty. “How non-state actors get dealt 
with in terms of the treaty is really through the implementa-
tion of national laws,” said Forman. “National laws take care 
of criminal legislation, trade controls, and the reporting and 
monitoring of industry within the national boundaries. That 
is complicated in a way because if all of the different states 
are allowed to have their own laws that create a lot of inter-
esting situations when you are trying to import and export 
across international boundaries.”
Forman presented a brief history of chemical weapons, 
starting with World War I. The first attempt at stopping the 
use of chemical weapons occurred in 1952 when countries 
signed the Geneva Protocol and pledged not to use chemical 
weapons in war except in response to a chemical weapons 
attack. Under the Geneva Protocol, countries continued to 
maintain stockpiles of chemical weapons and agents that 
were far more potent than the mustard gas used in the First 
World War. 
The verification process, said Forman, starts with a coun-
try declaring the chemical weapons it has in its possession. 
The verification division at OPCW evaluates these declara-
tions, monitors data for the production of specific chemicals, 
and sends inspectors into the field for on-site inspections. 
The chemicals fall into three schedules: warfare agents, 
chemical weapons precursors and breakdown products, and 
industrial dual-use chemicals, which include substances 
such as hydrogen cyanide and phosphorous trichloride that 
have important uses but that could be turned into chemical 
weapons. Also included are chemical production facilities 
producing more than 200 metric tons per year of discrete 
organic chemicals, or greater than 30 metric tons if the 
discrete organic chemicals contain phosphorous, sulfur, 
or fluorine. There are exemptions for chemical plants that 
make fuels, explosives, and oligomers. For those plants, 
verification involves ensuring that there is an absence of 
chemicals identified in the CWC Schedules. Forman noted 
that between 30,000 and 35,000 chemicals are scheduled, a 
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small percentage of the 140 million unique chemicals that 
have been synthesized. 
There are a number of concerns about chemicals listed 
under the CWC, Forman said. “We are always concerned 
if there are new routes to make toxic chemicals,” he said, 
citing the advent of biotechnological process as one exam-
ple. “There are concerns that you might be able to take a 
chemical that wouldn’t have been considered as something 
 weaponizable and through some new technology, perhaps 
drug delivery strategies that people use with nanoparticles, 
to turn it into something that could be used as a weapon. This 
is really less about chemical production and more about the 
formulation of chemicals,” Forman noted. Another concern 
is that banned activities can be disguised and not subject to 
the verification regime. 
One challenge for inspectors is telling the difference 
between a chemical weapons production facility and a com-
mercial chemical production plant. This challenge has been 
exacerbated by the continued development of new ways 
to make chemicals, such as through fermentation. “If you 
are looking for specific types of equipment that are being 
sold or imported or exported, it is not always obvious that 
the traditional equipment is the only thing you have to 
look at,”  Forman said. Even more vexing are differences in 
national level regulations concerning what types of plants 
are declared. “Declarations are not always consistent from 
state party to state party,” said Forman. “One of the States 
Parties actually declares breweries just to make the point that 
fermentation is a chemical process.”
The ability to transfer information easily is another con-
founding issue today for weapons inspectors. As an example, 
Forman said that it is possible to send a DNA sequence to a 
DNA synthesizing machine located anywhere in the world. 
“The people on the other end don’t actually have to know 
what I am making. They just have to be able to load up the 
machines with the right precursor materials,” said Forman. 
He added that his thinking on how to account for this type 
of information exchange is still in flux.
Chemical weapons programs carried out by nations are 
fairly easy to spot because they are usually technologi-
cally sophisticated, but this is not the case with non-state 
actors, where simple, cheap, obtainable technology is more 
valuable than sophistication. While such operations are 
supposed to be covered by national laws, it is possible for 
a non-state actor to cobble together simple technologies 
at a scale small enough to avoid being declared or detected. 
Forman noted that  weaponization requires more than just 
chemicals and facilities that are creating weaponizable 
materials have a certain look to them that can serve as a 
telltale sign for inspectors. 
The biggest challenge with chemical weapons is being 
ready to react. “For the OPCW, that means keeping a well-
maintained and well-skilled inspectorate, being up to date 
on analytical capabilities, knowledge of chemical weapons 
issues and how to handle them, and also having trained 
responders,” explained Forman. One way forward, he said, 
is to take a holistic view that looks at the big picture of 
what a facility looks like, the kinds of materials at the plant, 
the regulatory environment in which it exists, and the pos-
sible motivations of the people who are acquiring chemical 
manufacturing equipment. Taking a holistic view requires 
engaging experts with a broad range of skill sets. “You need 
people that can recognize when technologies might be of 
concern,” said Forman. “You need people that can recognize 
when new technologies could also be used to help you do 
better non-proliferation or better verification.” Finally, it is 
important to maintain a dialog and share information. “You 
need to teach people what is important and to understand 
the changes that are taking place in the world and how they 
fit into this bigger security picture,” Forman said in closing. 
Kathryn Hughes from the NRC asked if inspectors check 
the tracking numbers on equipment. Forman replied that 
the inspectors will do visual inspections in some plants and 
sampling and analysis in other plants. “They are not look-
ing for tracking numbers of individual equipment. They are 
looking to see that this plant has been declared as a discrete 
organic chemicals plant,” said Forman. He noted that if the 
inspectors are doing sampling or analysis, which is based 
on gas chromatography/mass spectrometry readings, they 
check to see if the analytical results are in the database of 
scheduled compounds.  
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE ON DUAL-USE CHEMICAL 
EQUIPMENT NON-PROLIFERATION
The reason that the United States opposes chemicals 
weapons, said Matthew Moakler, is that they are weapons of 
mass destruction that can only be used indiscriminately and 
that have a disproportionate impact on civilians. Since the 
1980s, the key to U.S. strategy regarding non-proliferation in 
this area has been to impede the flow of the items needed to 
make chemical weapons. He noted that the chemical  weapons 
programs of rogue states such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria were 
based almost entirely on items purchased from abroad. He 
also said that the real threat today is not from nation states 
as much as from so-called lone actors, such as the five Iraqis 
arrested in 2013 who were creating Sarin using small-scale 
production equipment or the American who pled guilty to 
producing ricin in his home and sending ricin-laced letters 
to various public officials, including President Obama and 
Senator John Wicker. 
Addressing the impact of controlling the export of dual-
use equipment, Moakler said that export controls help pre-
vent proliferators from acquiring the items that they need to 
make chemical weapons. “Sound export licensing decisions 
by supplier and transshipment countries, time and again, 
have had a tangible impact on proliferators by denying 
them access to the world’s best sources of technology and 
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equipment,” said Moakler. He noted that since the 1980s, 
particularly after the chemical weapons attacks during the 
Iran/Iraq war, individual countries cannot employ effective 
national export controls individually but have to do so in 
concert with one another. “The more states that adopt and 
effectively administer similar controls, the more effectively 
this objective can be achieved,” said Moakler. 
To that end, the United States coordinates its national 
export controls with the Australia Group, which includes 41 
countries and represents roughly 80 percent of the global 
trade in chemicals and chemical equipment. Over the past 
30 years, the Australia Group has focused on harmonizing 
and updating export controls of dual-use chemical and bio-
logical manufacturing items to ensure they do not contribute 
to weapons programs. The Australia Group has also shared 
information and lessons learned pertaining to the threat of 
chemical and biological weapons and regarding technology, 
enforcement, and interdiction in order to harmonize export 
controls across nations. It also reaches out to nonmembers 
to foster a better understanding of what this group is trying 
to accomplish and to encourage adoption of comparable 
export controls. That effort, said Moakler, has led many key 
exporters outside of the Australia Group, including China, 
India, Russia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, 
to implement export controls.
The reason for controlling the materials that are exported, 
Moakler explained, is that manufacturing chemical war-
fare agents is not unlike manufacturing other chemicals. 
It involves assembling a plant out of component parts that 
perform the basic unit operations of chemical engineering—
transportation, combination, separation, and reaction. These 
component parts are similar to those in any chemical plant 
around the world, with a few caveats. First, most chemical 
warfare agents are acids and many of their precursors are 
highly corrosive. Therefore, any surface that comes in con-
tact with them must be made of corrosion-resistant materials. 
It is possible to use regular stainless steel equipment, which 
is what Iraq was using at the end of its chemical weapons 
program, but these items must be replaced regularly because 
of corrosion, significantly increasing the cost of production 
and the time needed to realize a weapons program. The 
second caveat is that there is an extreme safety risk inherent 
in chemical warfare agent production, so there is a premium 
placed on preventing leaks through the use of equipment 
made of robust, corrosion-resistant materials, and then 
detecting those leaks with toxic gas monitors.
Moakler explained that deciding on a list of items to 
include in an export control program requires balancing 
the non-proliferation benefit with the commercial impact 
of licensing, a point made earlier by Charles Mooney in 
his presentation. “Finding that sweet spot is a challenge, 
especially at the policy level,” said Moakler, which is why 
export control lists are supplemented by what is known as the 
“catch-all” rule. The overriding goal, he said, is to capture 
items such as reactors, storage vessels, distillation columns, 
heat exchangers, pumps, valves, piping, filling equipment, 
and toxic gas monitors made of corrosion-resistant mate-
rials including glass, high-nickel steel, graphite, ceramics, 
fluoropolymers, titanium, zirconium, and other corrosion-
resistant exotic alloys.
Looking forward, there are several challenges for the use 
of effective export controls. One challenge is that the trend 
for chemical production to move to lower-cost countries 
means that fewer chemical producers will be part of the 
 Australia Group, which is why that group has been reaching 
out to new supplier countries to encourage them to adopt 
export controls. Another challenge arises from unlisted 
items, primarily those that are not corrosion resistant, which 
is the reason for the catch-all control lists that allow the 
United States and other Australia Group members to inter-
vene and require export licenses for unlisted items when they 
believe that the exports will contribute to chemical weapons 
proliferation. Moakler added that there is a great opportunity 
for industry to approach U.S. regulators if they have any 
suspicions that export of a given piece of equipment might 
lead to chemical weapons production.
The transfer of technology, either tangible or intangible, 
from one entity to another via non-physical means such as the 
Internet, was identified by Moakler as a major concern. He 
noted that controlling proliferation of this type of informa-
tion requires a combination of activities, such as promoting 
global norms via treaties and developing non-proliferation 
regimes in addition to the Australia Group that can marshal 
like-minded countries to work together to curb the spread 
of chemical weapons. Other tools for impeding the flow of 
technology includes unilateral interdiction of suspect ship-
ments, the threat of sanctions, providing technical and 
financial assistance to help countries put into place more 
effective export controls and destroy any chemical weapons 
stockpiles or production facilities, and visa screening that 
aims to identify individuals that are coming to the United 
States solely, incidentally, or principally to violate or evade 
any law prohibiting the exports of goods, technology, or 
sensitive information.
CHEMICAL SECURITY AND UNSCR 1540
Richard Cupitt began by providing an overview of 
UNSCR 1540, noting that it was unanimously adopted by 
the United Nations Security Council in 2004. The resolu-
tion was the first formal decision taken by the Security 
Council to address the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery 
as a threat to international peace and security. To that end, 
UNSCR 1540 identifies illicit trafficking in these weapons 
of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as 
related materials such as manufacturing equipment, as a 
new area of concern. In addition, this resolution focuses on 
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proliferation to and by non-state actors, another new empha-
sis for the Security Council. Within its text are more than 
200 specific obligations, and because it was adopted under 
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, these obligations 
are legally binding on all states. The resolution explicitly 
embraces various international legal instruments, including 
the CWC, while implicitly endorsing the lists from other 
multilateral agreements on export controls, such as those of 
the Australia Group.
The specific points listed in UNSCR 1540 include the 
requirement to account for and secure “related materials,” 
which includes equipment as well as technologies and mate-
rials in production, use, storage, and transportation. UNSCR 
1540 also obliges member states to restrict trafficking and 
brokering of such items by, among other means, controlling 
their export, transit, transshipment, and re-export. The reso-
lution specifically requires states to have end-user controls 
to help assure that non-state (and state) actors cannot use 
these methods to acquire indirectly the materials they need 
to produce weapons of mass destruction. 
Cupitt explained that UNSCR 1540 also created a com-
mittee, with a current mandate that runs until 2021, to over-
see enforcement. This committee, a subsidiary body of the 
Security Council, is advised by a group of experts, and its 
primary role is to monitor and report on implementation. The 
committee’s other tasks include data collection regarding the 
status of each nation state in terms of the measures they have 
taken to plan or implement each of the 200-plus obligations 
in the resolution. The committee creates a matrix1 for each of 
the 193 U.N. member states and each matrix has 382 fields 
that account for some aspect of implementation. “There is a 
lot of information in these matrices on legal measures and the 
legal framework,” explained Cupitt. Additional information 
on enforcement actions is also included in the matrix. The 
committee last reported to the Security Council in 2011 and 
is currently in the process of updating these matrices. 
The 2011 report showed that fewer than half of the mem-
ber nations had created a legal framework to account for the 
production, use, storage, or transport of chemical weapons-
related materials, and even fewer countries had enforcement 
measures in place. For those countries with laws on the books, 
very few had rules relating to accounting for equipment or 
technology and fewer than half had measures in place to 
secure equipment, technologies, and related mate rials. Out of 
the approximately 80 countries that have declared chemical 
weapons production facilities, 20 or so do not have any mea-
sures in place to secure production, use, storage, and transport 
of equipment, materials, and technologies at those facilities. 
One conclusion that Cupitt said can be drawn from the 2011 
report is that very few of the measures taken by countries are 
designed to address terrorism or proliferation. Most mea-
sures addressed other objectives, particularly environmental 
1
 http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/matrix.shtml.
concerns, worker safety, and public health. This is not true, 
however, for those nations in the Australia Group. 
One of the committee’s activities involves identifying 
the effective practices that nations are taking and to share 
those findings. “On the security side, most of the effective 
practices that the committee was able to identify would come 
from unconventional chemical sources,” said Cupitt, from 
organizations such as the International Marine Organization, 
the International Civil Aviation Organization, the U.N. Envi-
ronmental Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
and the World Health Organization. He noted, too, that the 
committee has worked with the OPCW on ways of securing 
materials based on the OPCW’s work on accounting, verifi-
cation, and destruction. 
The committee has also surveyed nations for their effec-
tive national practices and received submissions from 42 
states so far. “Unfortunately, only five of those even refer-
enced chemical security in any way,” said Cupitt. He added 
that the U.S. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
appear to be unique and the committee has been sharing 
these with the other nations. Several states, including the 
United States, are preparing new submissions on effective 
national practices.
Cupitt concluded his remarks by stating that while many 
members of the committee will say that nuclear or biologi-
cal weapons are more important because the mortality and 
morbidity associated with the use of those weapons is likely 
to be higher than for a chemical weapon attack, he takes the 
perspective that the risk of a successful chemical attack is 
much higher. “These things are easier to get and easier to 
produce. There is a real risk,” said Cupitt. On a positive note, 
he added that there is an opportunity for action because there 
are many ways of fitting chemical weapons non-proliferation 
activities into existing environmental compliance programs. 
CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT EXPORT CONTROLS
To start the session’s final presentation, Elizabeth Scott 
Sangine reminded the workshop that the authority for the 
federal government to require industry to take the appropriate 
steps to control the export of equipment that could be used to 
make chemical weapons comes from the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1970, when the primary worry was over the Soviet 
Union’s chemical weapons program. “There was not a com-
prehensive chemical weapons treaty at the time, but many 
of the supplier states did get together,” said Sangine. Export 
controls for chemical equipment were first added unilaterally 
to the U.S. Commerce Control List and then by the Australia 
Group in 1991. At the time, equipment was available from 
20 non-Australia Group countries, including Russia, China, 
India, South Africa, and Taiwan. Until 2005, she added, a 
U.S. export license was required only for so-called countries 
of concern. Today, an export license is required for all non-
Australia Group member countries.
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Sangine said that though the number of applications for 
chemical equipment export licenses has soared since 1999 
to close to 3,000 in 2013, the number of those applications 
that get rejected has stayed small, around three to four a year. 
“That just shows that most of the equipment is used for legiti-
mate business,” said Sangine. The requirement for a license, 
she said, is to enable the federal government to keep track of 
end-users and to provide information about end-users that a 
potential licensee might not be able to access. She added that 
there are export control lists for both chemicals and chemi-
cal equipment and that there are license exceptions available 
for industry to use for certain situations, such as in the case 
where there is a plant shutdown and a customer needs a 
replacement part. Temporary exemptions are granted so that 
companies can take equipment to international trade shows, 
and government-to-government exceptions are granted for 
emergency responses to disease outbreaks, for example. 
When it receives an application for an export license, 
Sangine’s office first reviews the construction materials and 
the performance capabilities for a given piece of equipment. 
She provided some advice for those who do need to apply 
for a license. “The reasons your export licenses might take 
longer than you would like is if we don’t really understand 
what you are shipping or why,” she told the workshop. “We 
really need this information when you apply.” Applications 
for an export license should include information on the spe-
cific intended end use, as well as other potential uses; the 
intended destination; and a description of the relationship 
the licensee has with the intended recipient company, includ-
ing information such as how long they have worked with the 
company and any other relevant background information. 
When a license is issued, it comes with a set of standard 
conditions that include a statement of end use; that there 
should be no resale, retransfer, or re-export without prior 
U.S. government authorization; that the equipment not be 
used to make chemical or biological weapons; and that the 
applicant must inform the consignee of these license condi-
tions. She explained that from the standpoint of the U.S. 
government, control continues to exist over an item for its 
entire lifetime, even if gets incorporated into some other 
piece of equipment. The reality, though, is that the U.S. 
government is incapable of knowing if an item is resold. 
There are Department of Commerce export control officers 
with law enforcement responsibilities stationed in  Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Russia, India, China, and the United Arab 
Emirates who conduct pre-license checks and post-shipment 
verifications. In addition, the Office of Export Enforcement 
collaborates with all of the U.S. law enforcement agencies 
to develop leads and monitor proliferation activities. She 
noted that most of the indicators of a proliferation network’s 
activities are financial in nature.
Sangine said that export controls are applicable when 
technology takes the form of technical data or technical assis-
tance and whether that technology is tangible or intangible. 
This provision becomes particularly germane for academics 
and universities who may not be aware that having a foreign 
national come to a laboratory to learn a new technology does 
fall under the export control regulations. The exceptions 
are if the foreign national is a green card holder, permanent 
resident, or protected individual as defined under U.S. Code. 
The applicable regulations are spelled out in Export Admin-
istration Regulations 734.2(b)(3), she added.
One of the big changes that have taken place since the 
1980s is that companies no longer store parts on site and 
now expect replacement parts to be delivered within hours, 
not days. However, issuing export licenses takes longer than 
that, explained Sangine. The Department of Commerce has 
adjusted to this new reality by allowing in-country storage, 
enacting internal procedures to shorten review times, and 
granting 4-year licenses. Another significant change has been 
the shift in concern from state chemical weapons programs 
to those run by terrorist organizations. As a result, the Com-
merce Department now works closely with the Department 
of State on sanction and embargo lists, and it issues regime 
denial notifications within the context of the Australia Group. 
She also said, “If you have a gut feeling that something is 
not right, apply for a license and let us be the ones to judge.”
 Sangine ended her comments by stating, “We know 
chemical equipment and chemical production is global and 
we have these controls to make it harder for proliferators. We 
know there are other things they can use, but this is just to 
hopefully slow it down a little bit. We do licensing as rapidly 
as possible, but we are always open to new ideas that help 
us. As I said, these are pretty old methods of doing export 
controls, so any and all new ideas are welcome.”
DISCUSSION
To open the discussion, Clara Zahradnik asked Sangine 
if the federal government would consider revising the CB3 
regulations in light of the migration of production and 
technology for chemical equipment. Sangine replied that 
the Department of Commerce is always open to taking sug-
gestions from industry and will take that idea under consid-
eration. Zahradnik replied, “I think maybe some creativity 
would help industry a lot.”
In response to a question from Nancy Jackson about 
enforcement, Cupitt acknowledged that enforcement is a dif-
ficult problem for the U.N. committee. “To some extent the 
committee is focused on the legal aspects and whether a law 
exists. If there is no legal measure, it is unlikely there will 
be any enforcement that will take place,” he said. What the 
committee has done is work closely with the United States 
and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to develop a 
strategic trade control enforcement project that the WCO 
will conduct. These activities will be similar to those the 
WCO has conducted for other illicit trafficking areas such 
as endangered species and human trafficking. He added that 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
The Global Movement and Tracking of Chemical Manufacturing Equipment:  A Workshop Summary
THE SECURITY DIMENSION 21
Interpol has an effort underway to identify potential chemi-
cal, biological, radiological, and nuclear facilities that non-
state actors could use for nefarious purposes. Cupitt noted 
that the European Union is training prosecutors, investiga-
tors, and judges to deal with these cases. 
Kathryn Hughes asked if there are any efforts underway to 
educate and train chemical engineers so that they can identify 
things that might be questionable when they go visit other 
facilities. Sangine replied that the Commerce Department 
does a great deal of outreach with industry and with major 
domestic trade groups. Academia, however, has been tougher 
to reach, she added. Cupitt said that outreach is not required 
under the U.N. resolution, but it is recommended and the 
committee does collect data on outreach efforts. “I would 
say there are a fair number of government outreach programs 
on the chemical side compared to the nuclear and biological 
sides,” said Cupitt. He added that the committee is engaging 
industry to develop codes of conduct at the facility level. 
Jonathan Forman acknowledged that OPCW’s efforts to 
“work with chemical engineers, particularly in the academic 
sector, have been fairly lax.” He also noted that OPCW often 
has difficulty hiring chemical engineers as inspectors, which 
he said creates a “compelling reason to recommend to our 
management that we go out and try to talk to the chemical 
engineering community in order to keep our inspectorate 
well informed and well trained going into the future.”
Jackson asked the speakers if they thought there should 
be additional chemicals added to the schedules list. Forman 
replied that there does not seem to be the political will from 
the member states to do that, and Cupitt said that this is really 
up to the individual states to define what goes on its control 
lists. Detlef Maennig added that the chemical industry’s posi-
tion on this matter is that it is against increasing the number 
of chemicals on the schedules at the moment unless there 
is a demonstrated case or there is a risk identified or there is 
a loophole in the convention. Cupitt also commented that 
when the U.S. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
were released, which included a list of chemicals of interest 
that included the scheduled compounds, the result was that 
several thousand chemical facilities changed their processes 
to get rid of the chemicals that were on the chemicals of 
interest list. “In essence, they became more proliferation 
resistant,” said Cupitt. 
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KEY POINTS
•	 Online marketplaces need comprehensive user poli-
cies that detail the types of items sold through their 
sites and a combination of software filters and human 
review to ensure that listed equipment is not shipped 
inappropriately. (Carson)
•	 Regulators need to provide key word lists and regu-
larly communicate with online marketplaces in order 
for screening and filters to be effective. (Carson)
Previous discussions at the workshop had identified the 
Internet and online marketplaces as an avenue for trans-
national movement of used chemical manufacturing equip-
ment and therefore as a new challenge to non-proliferation 
activities. At the start of the second day of the workshop, 
Michael Carson, Senior Manager for Global Regulatory and 
Policy Management at eBay, spoke about the steps that eBay 
takes to prevent regulated or illegal equipment from being 
sold and exported through its online auction site without the 
proper licenses. 
The eBay brand comprises three major businesses: eBay 
Marketplaces, its online auction site; PayPal, an online elec-
tronic payment system; and eBay enterprise, an e-commerce 
provider for large businesses. eBay Marketplaces, Carson 
said, has 145 million active users and 650 million live list-
ings at any one time. “From my perspective, we are always 
trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack because 
99.9 percent of those listings are completely legitimate,” said 
Carson. “There are a small percentage of items that my group 
and a group within eBay concentrate on and are looking at for 
violating listings. We also educate users about what potential 
hazards may be out there with different listings.”
For those at the workshop who were not familiar with 
eBay, Carson explained that it acts as a marketplace that 
brings together buyers and sellers and it never handles the 
goods itself. Sellers list items on the Marketplace and buyers 
from around the world can look at these items, bid on them, 
buy them, and  receive them directly from the seller. All that 
eBay does is facilitate the auction and collect and disburse 
the purchase price of the items. eBay earns revenue from an 
item listing fee and a small percentage of the final sale value. 
Other online marketplaces compete with eBay, said Carson, 
including Amazon, Craigslist, uBid, and eCrate.
eBay has policies set forth in a user agreement that details 
the type of items that cannot be sold through its Website. 
These policies, of which there are 54 that relate specifically 
to prohibited and restricted items, are enforced by monitoring 
users with a variety of tools, including filters created from 
information about export controls. The goal, said Carson, 
is to prevent listings that violate these policies from get-
ting on the site and then educating those who try to list a 
prohibited item so that they do not try again. If a prohibited 
item does get listed on its site, eBay works with investigators 
around the world to deal with that after the fact. “Whether 
it is working with law enforcement on an investigation of a 
fraudulent transaction or potentially illegal transaction, we 
have a whole team of people around the world that work with 
law enforcement to provide them with information to help 
with that investigation and if appropriate, prosecute those 
sellers that may be violating our policies,” explained Carson.
Aside from the user base complying with the provisions of 
the user agreement, eBay employs teams of customer support 
agents around the world to examine thousands of listings per 
day that are identified by filters as potential problem list-
ings. In some cases, this review results in eBay contacting 
the seller and providing them with information so that they 
can list the item, such as listing it only on eBay’s domestic 
site and not on its international sites, which would create the 
chance that the prohibited item would be exported. In other 
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cases, the items are permanently blocked with no referral to 
customer service agents. 
To illustrate how eBay enforces its listing prohibitions, 
Carson gave three examples that took place within one week, 
earlier in 2014. In the first example, a small Canadian town 
tried to auction a 40 foot sperm whale that had washed up on 
its shores after the Canadian government rejected the town’s 
call for help. Unfortunately for the town, eBay has a policy 
that prohibits the sale of endangered species—even dead 
ones—and the company notified the town that they could not 
list the carcass. “When we were developing our animal parts 
policy, we certainly didn’t have this in mind,” said Carson. 
“As you can see, we need to be able to expect anything.” 
In the second example, eBay was approached by the 
Australian Consumer Protection Agency about people selling 
inflatable pools that violated a new enacted safety standard. 
In response to the Australian government’s request, eBay 
created a message to inform users of this new provision of 
Australia’s law. Using filters, eBay’s system automatically 
targets and notifies relevant individuals “This is a very tar-
geted effort. We are not messaging anybody who is listing 
an item on eBay’s Australia site about swimming pools,” 
Carson explained. 
The third example involved a visit from a special agent 
from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) who 
talked to the company about goods whose export is con-
trolled by ITAR and Export Administration Regulations 
(EAR). From eBay’s perspective, the company prohibits 
these items from being exported outside of the United States 
altogether. NCIS wanted to know how eBay dealt with these 
items and understand how its filters work, while eBay was 
interested in improving its filters with keywords that NCIS 
could provide. “It is a collaborative situation when we work 
with these regulatory agencies,” Carson explained.
eBay’s prohibitions related to ITAR and EAR-regulated 
goods, detailed in one of its 54 policies, starts from a policy 
position of first trying to educate its user community about 
the regulations. For ITAR-listed items, eBay’s policy states 
that both buyer and seller have to be located within the 
United States. The policy provides a Web link to the relevant 
regulations. eBay’s guiding philosophy is that the majority 
of its users are not trying to abuse the system and that they 
comply with these policies once they are educated about the 
prohibitions for specific items. 
The eBay Listing Violation Identification System 
(eLVIS)—the filters that screen every potential eBay listing 
before it is posted to the Web—is a rules-based engine built 
using keywords from a variety of sources. Among these 
sources are member reports—every eBay member can report 
an item as a potential violation—internal input, regulatory 
agencies, law enforcement agencies, and industry. eBay 
works closely with the Food and Drug Administration and 
Drug Enforcement Agency, for example, in the area of drugs 
and supplements, both legal and illegal. It also works with the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission to identify recalled 
items, with the Fish and Wildlife Service on prohibited 
items such as ivory carvings, and with the U.S. Agriculture 
Department on the important export of seeds, plants, and 
animal products. The company works with a similar set of 
regulators in the European Union, Australia, and the Asia-
Pacific region, though Carson added that these international 
agencies have not been as interactive with eBay as have 
U.S. agencies in terms of providing keywords or language 
for the filters.
In some cases, law enforcement agencies will act as a 
buyer on the site for undercover investigations. To create 
export control filters, eBay looks at several listing attributes, 
including the keywords used to describe the product, the 
category in which it is listed, the shipping destinations and 
the location of the eBay site where the item is posted, and the 
buyer’s location. Carson noted that improving the filters to 
reduce false positives and still catch prohibited items, all 
while keeping the filters up to date, is a never-ending process. 
“We are always trying to fine tune the filters and looking at 
different circumvention techniques,” said Carson.
 He described an example of the type of blocking mes-
sage that gets sent to a user. In this case, the user was selling 
night vision goggles, which are legal to sell but not to export 
from the United States under ITAR regulations. The message 
informs the seller that the item cannot be exported, but that it 
can be listed if the seller restricts shipping options to exclude 
shipping outside of the United States. It also provides links 
to the relevant regulations and eBay’s policies concerning 
items that violate those regulations so that the seller can learn 
from the experience. Similarly, if a buyer tries to purchase 
an item that requires an export license from another country, 
the system notifies the buyer of that requirement and again 
provides links to relevant information. 
While eBay is dedicated to being a good corporate citizen, 
it is also concerned about the eBay brand. “We don’t want 
to be associated with illegal items or brand-damaging items. 
We don’t want the headline to be that users saw a drone on 
eBay that was exported to Syria or something like that. Even 
though eBay may not be directly liable for that—it may be 
the seller who is prosecuted for it—it is brand damaging for 
us from an eBay perspective and also it impacts whether 
other people are going to use eBay,” said Carson. “It is in 
our own self-interest, separate from the legal and regulatory 
interest, to make sure that we have a safe and well-lit market-
place that is actively policed.”
DISCUSSION
When asked how long it takes from the time a flag occurs 
to when a person reviews the flagged listing, Carson replied 
that the goal is 6 hours, though sometimes it can take as long 
as 24 hours. Richard Cupitt then asked if eBay refers blocked 
items to law enforcement agencies. Carson replied that the 
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listings for any flagged item are delayed automatically from 
posting for 6 hours. He added that blocked items—those 
that are immediately spotted by eLVIS, blocked, and never 
referred to customer service—are never posted so there is 
nothing to refer to law enforcement. “If there is an item that 
does get onto our site and then is exported, we will work 
with the law enforcement agency, either proactively if we 
find it or reactively if they come to us, to provide them with 
information for this seller. In that scenario, we have a whole 
team that works with law enforcement on that,” said Carson.
Cupitt also asked if eBay works with the Department of 
Commerce on items regulated by EAR. Carson explained 
that with EAR, since it can cover such a wide variety of 
goods, the company looks at large categories of items and 
broader-based keywords so that it can send an educational 
message to both buyers and sellers. “We are not actually 
blocking the item,” said Carson, “because at the end of the 
day, we don’t know whether it is actually export controlled 
or not or if it is to which countries. The approach we try to 
take is we cast a broader net for EAR, but from an education 
standpoint as opposed to blocking and taking down.”
Astrid Lewis asked how eBay employees are trained to 
use eLVIS. Carson explained that it brings representatives 
of regulatory and law enforcement agencies to its Salt Lake 
City service center, which is where its North America eLVIS 
team is located. eBay and the agencies see these training ses-
sions as two-way streets, Carson said, because both parties 
end up learning through these interactions. The agencies, for 
example, learn what eBay is seeing in terms of new trends, 
while eBay learns about any gray areas that need particular 
attention. He noted, too, that the eLVIS database has upwards 
of 20,000 different rules, each of which can contain from 
five to a thousand keywords, and that the company tries to 
focus on areas where historically it has seen violations. “We 
are trying not to boil the ocean,” he said. “We are always 
iterating, always going back and looking at how did this 
item get through.”
Kathryn Hughes asked Carson if he knows of other com-
panies that go through similar lengths to screen the items 
it sells or lists. He replied that the situation is mixed, with 
some companies taking the same intensive approach that 
eBay takes and others that are completely reactive—letting 
anything on the site and then taking it down only when 
someone outside the company, such as user or law enforce-
ment, points out a problem. “As much as our stockholders 
wished that everything you could buy and sell is only on 
eBay, unfortunately, that is not the case. There is a whole big 
Internet out there with different ways they can bring buyers 
and sellers together,” said Carson. “Even if we solved the 
problem on eBay in a particular area, that is not going to 
solve the problem on the Internet by a long shot.” He said 
eBay does share its best practices through various industry 
groups and it benefits from what other companies are doing 
in this area, too.
Clara Zahradnik asked Carson if chemical manufacturing 
equipment ever appears on eBay. He replied that such equip-
ment is listed under the business and industrial category, 
which can also include items such as medical devices and 
farm machinery. He also noted in response to a question 
from Prieto that eBay tracks the type of blocked items that 
users try to list and how frequently they do so in order to spot 
trends that could be useful both for internal screening efforts 
and law enforcement agencies. 
In response to a question from Cupitt as to whether eBay 
screens for names on specifically designated terrorist lists, 
Carson responded that eBay Marketplace does not, but 
PayPal and other financial institutions do that. “Ultimately, 
there is no way to use eBay without a financial instrument, 
so we rely on PayPal’s screening for that,” he explained. He 
added that eBay does look for items from embargoed coun-
tries, such as Cuban cigars and Iranian rugs, and for specific 
items by name and part number that are ITAR-listed. Carson 
explained that while some ITAR-listed items can be exported 
with the proper export license, eBay has no practical way of 
checking whether the sellers have the required licenses. “We 
made the decision to say if it is ITAR controlled, it can’t be 
shipped outside the United States,” said Carson. 
 Detlef Maennig asked if eBay can be sued for having pro-
hibited items on its site. Carson said that generally speaking, 
the company has immunity in the United States as a market-
place because it does not control the items. “Ultimately, the 
legal responsibility falls on the buyer and/or seller in those 
areas,” he explained. From a civil standpoint, eBay has been 
sued by a number of rights owners over counterfeit goods, 
but so far, the company has successfully defended itself in 
those cases. “We do have programs in place to address those 
concerns, but ultimately it is not eBay’s legal responsibility.” 
In Europe, he continued, the standards are somewhat differ-
ent, and the company has an international legal team to deal 
with the legal responsibilities. 
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As the workshop’s final activity, the attendees gathered for 
a session of deliberations and discussion focused on a set of 
questions that the attendees received prior to the workshop. 
These questions were modified slightly from those in the 
Statement of Task (see Appendix A) to reflect the expertise 
of the final workshop program while remaining in accord 
with the intention of the task. The questions were: 
1. How do the changes in the global chemical manu-
facturing landscape over the last 10 years affect the 
efficacy of current regulatory structures regarding 
the monitoring and movement of chemical manufac-
turing equipment around the globe?
2. Are there readily identifiable security gaps or mis-
matches that exist under the current system of 
controls and regulations? How might advances in 
manufacturing technologies, such as the increased 
use of microreactors, affect the ability to monitor for 
diversion or misuse of equipment?
3. What changes or steps might be necessary in the next 
10 years to support robust tracking and monitoring 
of potential dual-use equipment to support U.S. and 
global non-proliferation goals?
In addressing these questions, the following key points 
were raised, reiterating those that were noted throughout the 
day’s presentations and discussions:
•	 The rapid globalization of both the chemical indus-
try and equipment manufacturing capabilities has 
created a situation where existing regulations and 
 treaties are less capable of tracking and controlling 
the movement of chemical manufacturing equipment 
and where more emphasis is needed in education, 
training, and outreach efforts to create national 
and, even more importantly, corporate cultures that 
respect and support the goals of non-proliferation. 
(Mooney, Prieto, Souza)
•	 Regulations must balance the need to control the 
movement of chemical manufacturing equipment 
with the speed and flexibility that industry requires 
to operate profitably in an increasingly competitive 
marketplace. (Desrosiers, Wright, Cupitt) In general, 
U.S. companies’ internal policies are more restrictive 
than existing treaties require. (Mooney, Zahradnik, 
Desrosiers, Moakler)
To start the discussion, Charles Mooney said the biggest 
change over the past 10 to 20 years has been the shift from a 
regional production emphasis to a truly global one. By this 
he meant that as production capabilities moved outside of the 
United States or Europe, those capabilities were developed 
to meet local and regional needs for specific chemicals and 
materials. Today, chemical plants are not only flexible in 
terms of what they produce but they also can be dissembled 
and moved to meet demand as it shifts region by region. The 
relevance of this change, he said, is that the regulations as 
they exist today are U.S.-centric and were developed on the 
premise that all of the expertise for making and using chemi-
cal manufacturing equipment was located here and perhaps 
Europe. Going forward, a useful approach may be to get the 
message out to all of the new centers of global expertise that 
responsible use must be part of the corporate culture and 
that it takes effort and focus to develop that kind of culture. 
Craig Desrosiers proposed that regulators should consider 
creating an “elite user” policy that would apply to specific 
companies that have gone through a pre-selection process. 
This process would assess a given company’s policies and its 
responsible uses of various types of equipment. Companies 
that met certain criteria would then be granted the ability 
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to move equipment around the globe to meet its produc-
tion needs. Another approach would be for a company to 
provide a list of fabricators that it planned to use for some 
extended time period and that could be vetted ahead of time. 
“I understand the need for regulations, but it costs industry 
millions of dollars a year to fulfill these obligations. There 
has to be some way that you can get to the end goal that you 
need to get to, but we can be able to continue to operate,” 
said Desrosiers. Matthew Moakler said that the Commerce 
Department has a validated end user program, but that to 
be pre-approved by this program companies have to release 
details of their business practices to the federal government 
for review, something that most companies are reluctant to 
do. “It might be worth looking at this validated end user 
program and figure out how it can work more effectively.”
Richard Cupitt noted that there are provisions for what 
are called special comprehensive licenses that allow a com-
pany to export multiple times to the same end user or export 
certain commodities multiple times to different end users. 
He acknowledged that this program has not been used often 
because of the extensive set of requirements that companies 
have to meet to be granted this type of license, but he added 
that it may be worth looking more closely at this program to 
see if it can be improved and become more generally useful. 
Ana Prieto asked if there might be a way of constructing 
tax breaks or other assistance so that smaller companies 
build the systems that will help foster a compliance mindset. 
She also noted that the pharmaceutical industry is develop-
ing technology that enables it to track individual bottles of 
drugs and wondered if that technology could be applicable 
to manufacturing equipment. Another participant asked if 
it would be possible to create one central source, perhaps a 
Web site, where a company could go to as a single source 
for information on export controls. 
With regard to gaps that need to be addressed, Cupitt 
said that while all of the nations that have agreed to UNSCR 
1540 have obligations to account for materials and equip-
ment, many countries have not followed through on those 
obligations. He added that the United Nations committee 
that oversees UNSCR 1540 is in the process of collecting 
examples of how individual countries are working to meet 
these obligations. The chemical industry could play a role 
in addressing this gap by helping these countries  better 
understand their obligations, an idea that Prieto, Astrid 
Lewis, and Maennig also suggested, with Maennig noting 
that outreach activities should be tried before creating new 
legal requirements. Lewis noted that the fertilizer industry, 
after the Oklahoma City federal building bombing, took it 
upon itself to educate the public and small business while 
Congress was trying to decide what kind of law to pass. Usha 
Wright, who moderated the discussion, said that it is impor-
tant not to overburden industry with regulations that make it 
uncompetitive with companies based in countries with fewer 
regulations. She added, though, that industry has a vested 
interest in helping enforce the regulations that already exist 
because no company wants its name associated with some 
global terror event. 
Andrew Souza, whose responsibilities at the Department 
of State include detailing cases of proliferation, noted that 
over the past 15 years the West has been closed to prolifera-
tors. Rather, proliferation has been tied to China, India, and 
other emerging countries. “We in the United States spend a 
lot of time and have spent a lot of time reaching out to these 
emerging chemical producing countries to get them more 
active and get their practices up to Western standards,” said 
Souza. “It is really only in the last five years that it is starting 
to dawn on countries like India and China that this is impor-
tant and they have to devote resources to it. My hope would 
be in the next 10 years of more arm twisting and cajoling 
that we will get India and China to where they need to be. 
That will hopefully lighten the burden on the industry side 
because maybe we can look at relaxing the licensing require-
ments for those countries.”
Kathryn Hughes asked the industry representatives to 
comment on how their companies’ practices intersect with 
regulations. Mooney said that Xylem’s policies are based 
on the regulations but that they are often more extensive 
than regulations require. “Typically, our policies will go 
past the regulatory requirements,” he said, explaining that 
the reason for doing this is to protect the company’s name. 
Xylem also works with its employees to understand why 
these policies exist and why the company believes they 
are important. Zahradnik said that DuPont takes the same 
approach in at least some cases, believing that there can be 
more risk than embodied in the regulations and that company 
policies need to be more restrictive as a result in those cases. 
Desrosiers added that the vendors that DuPont uses globally 
go through an extensive qualification process, noting that he 
and his colleagues spend half of their time traveling to ven-
dors to vet them. Maennig expressed a contrary view, stating 
that his company follows the regulations and goes no further, 
and he believes that the chemical industry is largely moving 
in that direction. “I am cautioning that you shouldn’t have 
too much hope that industry is going beyond what is really 
required,” he stated. 
Prieto, who has had experience working with both large 
and mid-sized companies, said that large companies have the 
capabilities to engage in these types of self-regulating activi-
ties and outreach efforts. However, mid-sized and smaller 
companies often lack the necessary centralization, and in 
some cases, they do not even have the proper understanding 
of the regulations to enforce them with company policies. 
Cupitt said that countries often react better when com-
panies say that certain actions are taken for company policy 
rather than because it is U.S. policy. Along the same lines, 
Lewis said many countries say they agree to be part of 
international agreements because they hope to be eligible to 
compete for business in return. If companies are reinforcing 
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this idea through their own policies and stressing the fact 
that they will only do business with those that pass a vetting 
process that includes meeting treaty obligations, then that can 
act as a powerful incentive to these emerging economies to 
participate in these agreements. 
Turning the discussion to the third question, Hughes 
asked the non-proliferation experts what capabilities they 
need going forward to keep track of what has become a 
highly complex, global chemical industry. “What are the 
networks, communities, and discussions that are going to 
allow you to be responsive, regardless of the regulations?” 
she asked. Moakler said that there are many processes within 
government that need to be improved to make the review 
process more efficient. He also said that much of what the 
Department of State has done so far is to engage international 
organizations such as the Australia Group and that these 
organizations are planning extensive outreach efforts that 
include compiling best practices that can be shared. He was 
curious as to whether there might be customer service type 
applications that industry uses today with its customers that 
might be duplicated elsewhere. For example, many consumer 
products today come with the opportunity to register the 
product online complete with serial number, establishing 
a communication channel between the buyer and seller. “A 
system like this might contribute to accounting later on,” he 
suggested. 
Zahradnik asked if it would be possible to have EAR 
translated into Chinese and Hindi to make it easier for 
companies from those countries to follow U.S. regulations. 
Cupitt said that this would be expensive and that it would be 
unlikely that any translations would be considered official 
for legal purposes. 
Addressing Hughes’s question, Cupitt said that it would 
be helpful to make it someone’s job to do outreach to industry 
on a regular basis. That occurs in some countries, he said, 
but it is usually done on an ad hoc basis. He also noted that 
U.S. agencies are making use of social media to do outreach 
and he wondered if it would be possible to do so using more 
formal mechanisms. “If you have formal mechanisms, it is 
usually part of somebody’s job and that somebody is then 
evaluated based on how well they do that job. Without that, 
it’s luck of the draw,” Cupitt said. He recommended, too, that 
licensing officers should be provided with regular training 
opportunities to learn about the latest technologies. 
Lewis said that the U.S. government has several projects 
ongoing that may help track technologies. One project, 
known as FUSE, looks at all of the patents that have been 
filed using a number of databases and journals to identify 
new, emerging technologies and  new code words being used 
with certain industries. Another program, called FORM-ST, 
goes out to the wider science and technology community to 
forecast potential breakthroughs in science and technology 
fields. Zahradnik added that the Department of Commerce 
does have technology advisory committees for each of the 
categories in EAR and that the agency is looking to broaden 
industry participation in these committees. Desrosiers asked 
if it would be possible to conduct a deeper analysis of the 
license applications that are not approved to serve as an 
educational component, and Moakler noted that his office 
is doing just that. In a final comment, Wright said that one 
resounding theme that came through in this discussion is that 
there is a role for partnerships within industry and between 
industry and government. 
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An ad hoc committee will plan and conduct a public 
workshop to examine key concerns regarding availability 
and movement of equipment for chemical manufacture that 
is of potential dual-use concern. The workshop will examine 
topics such as:
•	 How well do current systems to track production, 
sale, transfer, and destruction of equipment of 
dual-use concern operate? What shortcomings exist 
nationally and globally?
•	 How are advances in manufacturing technologies, 
such as increased use of microreactors or fermenta-
tion techniques for chemical production, impacting 
the ability to monitor for diversion or misuse of 
equipment?
•	 What changes might be necessary in the next 10 years 
to assure sufficiently robust tracking and monitoring 
Appendix A
Statement of Task
of potential dual-use equipment to support U.S. and 
global non-proliferation goals?
The committee will develop the agenda for the workshop, 
select and invite speakers and discussants and moderate the 
discussions. The 2-day event will include plenary talks, 
discussion, and break-out sessions as appropriate. Invitees 
will include technical experts in chemistry and chemical 
engineering, experts in the global chemical industry, and 
experts in policy and non-proliferation. Participants will 
include members of the scientific community from indus-
try, academia, and non-profit organizations. Governmental 
technical personnel and experts in non-proliferation will also 
be invited to participate. International attendees, particu-
larly those from developing countries of interest (Pakistan, 
 Indonesia, or others) will help provide a global perspective.
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8:30–8:45 Welcome and Panel Introduction
Session 1: The Global Landscape




Session 2: The Lifetime of Manufacturing Equipment
10:15–10:20 Panel Introductions
10:20–10:45 Charles Mooney, Xylem, Inc.
10:45–11:10 Ye Shao, Morimatsu Group
11:10–11:35 Ana Prieto, Independent Consultant




Session 3: The Security Dimension
1:30–1:35 Panel Introduction
1:35–2:00 Jonathan Forman, Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Appendix B
Workshop Agenda
Workshop on the Global Movement and Tracking of Chemical Manufacturing Equipment
May 12-13, 2014
National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC
Room 120
2:00–2:25 Matthew J. Moakler, U.S. Department of 
State
2:25–2:50 Richard T. Cupitt, U.S. Department of State
2:50–3:15 Elizabeth Scott Sangine, Bureau of 
Industry and Security, U.S. Department of 
Commerce
3:15–3:45 Discussion




Session 4: The Internet as a Secondary Market
8:30–8:35 Speaker Introduction
8:35–9:00 Michael Carson, eBay, Inc.
9:00–9:30 Discussion 
Session 5: Breakout Groups and Discussion
9:30–10:45 Breakout Groups
10:45–11:15 Report Back and Discussion
11:15–11:30 Closing Thoughts and Adjournment
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Speakers (in order of appearance)
Session 1: The Global Landscape
Detlef Maennig, CEFIC- The European Chemical 
Industry Council
Dr. Maennig studied chemistry at the University of Bonn, 
obtained his M.Sc. from Yale University and his Ph.D. from 
the University of Munich. He has been an industrial chemist 
for Evonik Industries for almost 30 years in various func-
tions in Germany, the U.S. and in the Peoples Republic of 
China. For over 25 years, he has been involved in Chemical 
 Weapons Convention (CWC)-related issues from nego-
tiations in Geneva to practical implementation in Member 
States. He has written numerous articles and is a frequent 
speaker on this topic. Most recently, he was awarded the 
 German Federal Cross of Merit for his contributions to 
the CWC.
Session 2: The Lifetime of Manufacturing Equipment
Charles Mooney, Xylem, Inc.
Mr. Mooney is a Trade Compliance and Business profes-
sional that has designed and implemented effective trade 
compliance programs in challenging business situations and 
industries. He is Director of Global Trade Compliance at 
Xylem, Inc. His experience includes Research, Operations 
and Marketing. He has combined this and applied it in the 
development and implementation of global trade compli-
ance programs in diverse industries including materials for 
electronic assemblies and equipment for the transport and 
measurement of water. His expertise includes  Customs, 
multinational trade agreements, their application to vari-
ous global export regulations and the ITAR. He is a U.S. 
Appendix C
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Licensed Customs Broker and has a Bachelor’s Degree 
in Biology from Boston College, a Master’s Degree in 
Chemical Engineering from the University of Massachusetts, 
 Lowell, and an Executive MBA from Suffolk University.
Ye Shao, Morimatsu Group
Mr. Shao has worked with the Morimatsu Group since 
2005, and has held several managerial positions within the 
company. Currently, Mr. Shao is Manager of International 
Relations, operating in both Texas and Shanghai. From 
2009-2011, he served as Manager of International Business 
Development, and from 2005-2009, he was the Manager of 
Overseas Project Coordination. Mr. Shao holds a Bachelor 
of Arts degree and a Master’s degree in International Political 
Economy. He specializes in strategic planning, international 
business planning, industrial analysis, and Chinese manu-
facturing consultation.
Ana Prieto, Environmental Health & Safety Professional
Ms. Prieto is an accomplished, results-driven executive, with 
close to 30 years of experience in leading global environ-
ment, health, and safety (EHS) functions, primarily in the 
pharmaceuticals industry. She has provided strategic and 
technical leadership in a variety of roles, most recently as 
Vice President, EHS, in the Americas region for Teva Phar-
maceuticals. Ms. Prieto is a CIH and is admitted to the bar in 
both New York and New Jersey. She is member of numerous 
professional associations and has served as Chair and Vice-
chair of the ABIH. Ms. Prieto holds a B.S. in Environmental 
Sciences from Cook College, Rutgers University in New 
Brunswick, NJ, earned an MSPH in Environmental Sciences 
and Engineering from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, NC, and completed her J.D. at Pace University 
School of Law, with a focus on environmental law.
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J. Craig Desrosiers, E.I. du Pont Canada Company
Mr. Desrosiers is a Senior Buyer at E.I. du Pont Canada 
Company. He has strategic sourcing responsibilities that 
include the strategic development and supply chain optimiza-
tion for the process equipment needs for E.I. du Pont global 
operations. This includes the development of global sourcing 
 strategies, supplier qualifications, and contract negotiations. 
His expertise includes global supply chain development, con-
tract administration and engineering design. This expertise 
has allowed him to modify existing design paradigms, and 
supply chains, in collaboration with engineering colleagues, 
to meet current business needs in accordance with core 
 values and business goals. He brings with him over 24 years 
of experience in mechanical engineering design, process pip-
ing design, strategic sourcing, and construction.
Session 3: The Security Dimension
Jonathan Forman, Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons 
Dr. Forman currently holds the post of science policy adviser 
at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW). Dr. Forman received a Ph.D. in chemistry from the 
California Institute of Technology in 1996, after which he 
worked for a series of biotechnology companies developing 
molecular diagnostic and bioanalytical assay technologies 
for genomic, immunoassay, and cell capture applications. 
He has been at OPCW (and away from Silicon Valley) since 
March of 2013.
Matthew J. Moakler, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Moakler is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of 
 Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau 
of International Security and Nonproliferation. He is the 
Chair of the SHIELD Licensing Group, an interagency 
group that reviews export license applications for chemical 
and biological proliferation concerns. Mr. Moakler has over 
12 years of experience in the field of countering weapons 
of mass destruction; serving in various positions including 
as a hazardous materials response team leader, a strategic 
level planner, and the team leader for an emergency man-
agement building partnership capacity program. He earned 
his MS in Biodefense from George Mason University, BS in 
 Biology from Siena College, and is currently pursuing a MS 
in Countering WMD Studies through the National Defense 
University and Missouri State University.
Richard T. Cupitt, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Cupitt serves as the U.S. UNSCR 1540 Coordinator in 
the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives at the U.S. State 
Department, fostering the implementation of UNSCR 1540 
nationally and globally. From 2005 to 2012, he worked as 
an Expert for the Committee established pursuant to UN 
Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). As such he helped 
monitor and facilitate implementation of resolution 1540 in 
all UN Member States, along with building relationships 
with more than forty international organizations, industry, 
and academia. Securing chemical weapons related materials 
in production, use, storage, and transport comprise an impor-
tant element of the more than two hundred legally binding 
obligations of UNSCR 1540. 
Dr. Cupitt held a position as Scholar-in-Residence at 
American University from 2004-2008, after serving as 
Special Adviser for International Cooperation for the U.S. 
Undersecretary of Commerce in the Bureau of Industry and 
Security from 2002-2004. From 1988-2002, Dr. Cupitt had 
various posts for the Center International Trade and Security 
(CITS) of the University of Georgia, including Associate 
Director, and also as a visiting scholar at the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies (CSIS). Dr. Cupitt also has 
held academic positions at Emory University and the Univer-
sity of North Texas. He has produced four books and more 
than 20 peer-reviewed articles on export controls, along with 
dozens of other non-proliferation, security or trade-oriented 
publications. In addition, he has served as a consultant on 
projects for the U.S. State Department, several U.S. national 
commissions and U.S. national nuclear laboratories, and 
several international organizations.
Elizabeth Scott Sangine, Bureau of Industry and 
 Security, U.S. Department of Commerce
Ms. Sangine is the Director of the Chemical and Biological 
Controls Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. In her role as Director of the 
Chemical and Biological Controls Division, Ms. Sangine 
manages export licensing for dual-use items controlled for 
chemical and biological non-proliferation. She participates 
in the multilateral regime negotiations for the Australia 
Group, and formulates policy as it relates to biological 
security, dual-use research of concern, and chemical issues. 
She works extensively with the interagency and industry on 
the list of controlled items and the licensing of these items. 
Ms. Sangine started her career in the private sector in the 
Chemical Industry and the Tele communications Industry 
where she was a product development specialist, qual-
ity specialist, and project manager. She has been with the 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 
since 2003. Ms. Sangine has a Bachelor of Science Degree 
in Chemical Engineering (BSChE) from Virginia Tech, a 
Masters of Business Administration (MBA) Degree from 
the University of Houston, a Master’s of Science in Natural 
Resource Strategy (MS) from the National Defense Univer-
sity, and a certified graduate of the Commerce Senior Execu-
tive Service Candidate Development Program. 
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Session 4: The Internet as a Secondary Market
Michael Carson, eBay, Inc.
Mr. Carson is the Senior Manager for Global Regulatory 
and Policy Management at eBay. In this role, Mr. Carson 
is responsible for developing and implementing policies to 
effectively manage eBay’s regulatory, industry, and brand 
risks. Mr. Carson also spent 5 years at PayPal heading their 
North America Brand Risk Management Group. Prior to 
joining eBay and PayPal in 2005, Mr. Carson worked in the 
government relations field for an issues management group 
focusing on technology and privacy matters. In addition, he 
also spent 3 years in the public sector serving as Staff Director 
for the Senate Minority Leader’s Office in the Massachusetts 
State House. Mr. Carson is a Boston College graduate with a 
B.A. in Political Science. 
Organizing Committee Members
Nancy B. Jackson, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Jackson is a Franklin Fellow at the U.S. Department of 
State working in both the Science Advisor to the Secretary 
of State’s office and in the International Security and Non-
proliferation Bureau. Previously, she was manager of the 
International Chemical Threat Reduction Department in 
the Global Security Center at Sandia National Laboratories 
which assists the U.S. Department of State in solving prob-
lems related to international chemical security and chemical 
weapons non-proliferation. With the DOS Chemical Security 
Engagement Program (CSP), Dr. Jackson has worked with 
universities, small/medium chemical companies, and govern-
ment regulators in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle 
East, and North Africa. Before working in chemical security, 
Dr. Jackson was deputy director of Sandia’s International 
Security Program where she assisted the director in fulfill-
ing its mission to create technology-based solutions through 
international cooperation to reduce the threat of all weapons 
of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. Prior to her 
positions in Global Security, Dr. Jackson was involved in 
alternative energy research and development at Sandia, as a 
principal investigator and a manager. 
Dr. Jackson received the 2013 Award for Science and 
Diplomacy from the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science where she is also a Fellow. She was recipient 
of the 2005 American Indian Science and Engineering Soci-
ety Professional of the Year Award. Dr. Jackson has a B.S. 
degree in chemistry from George Washington University 
from which she won a Distinguished Alumni Achievement 
Award in 2005 and has a Ph.D. in chemical engineering from 
the University of Texas at Austin. In 2009, she was elected 
to the Presidential succession of the American Chemical 
Society. She served as President-Elect for 2010, President 
for 2011, and Immediate Past President for 2012, and is a 
fellow of the American Chemical Society.
Robert E. Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses
Dr. Roberts is the Senior Scientist at the Institute for Defense 
Analyses and former Director of the Science and Technol-
ogy Policy Institute. He is also the former Vice President 
for Research and Director of IDA’s Science and Technology 
Division. Before joining IDA, he spent several years with 
the Department of Energy, and prior to that, he was associate 
professor of chemistry at Indiana University. Dr. Roberts is 
founder, former director, and mentor for the IDA Defense 
Science Study Group, a program established to foster interest 
in national security issues among outstanding young profes-
sors of science and engineering. Dr. Roberts received his 
bachelor’s degree in chemistry from the  Carnegie Institute 
of Technology (now Carnegie Mellon), his Ph.D. in physi-
cal chemistry from the University of  Wisconsin, and was a 
National Science Foundation postdoctoral research fellow at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Usha Wright, O’Brien & Gere 
Ms. Wright is senior vice president and co-general counsel 
for O’Brien & Gere, an environmental engineering and con-
sulting firm with offices throughout USA. She has extensive 
international industry experience in chemical safety. In 2008 
she retired as senior vice president for global workforce 
strategy at ITT Corporation, a position she had held since 
2005. From 1993 to 2005 Ms. Wright was vice president and 
associate general counsel for ITT, with global responsibility 
for environment, safety, and health (ES&H). Before joining 
ITT, she was executive director of environmental health and 
safety at Ciba Geigy Pharmaceuticals from 1977 to 1993. 
Ms. Wright has a B.S. in chemistry from Rutgers Univer-
sity, an M.S. from the University of North Carolina, and a 
J.D. from Rutgers University. She was an adjunct faculty 
of  Rutgers Law School from 1999 to 2006. As a Certified 
Industrial Hygienist and a Certified Safety Professional, she 
has served on the boards of the American Industrial Hygiene 
Association and the Board of Certified Safety professionals. 
She also served on the board of the Environmental Law Insti-
tute for last 8 years, where she was involved in conducting 
training in ES&H compliance in various academic institu-
tions in India. Currently, she is also president and chairperson 
of the board of SHARE (shareafrica.org), a nongovernmental 
organization working in western Kenya.
Clara J. Zahradnik, DuPont
Dr. Zahradnik joined DuPont 34 years ago after complet-
ing a Ph.D. at MIT in physical chemistry. She is currently 
the Export Control Leader for the DuPont Chemicals & 
Fluoroproducts (DC&F) division and has held that position 
since 2006. Her experience is in commodity and technology 
(chemical process and chemical equipment) export licens-
ing. She has also developed strong expertise in the design 
and construction of chemical equipment utilized in sulfur 
acid recovery at oil refineries, titanates, fluorochemical 
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refrigerants, cyanides, dimethylamine, and other products. 
Dr. Zahradnik has an extensive background in R&D in the 
laboratory and industrial plant settings coupled with busi-
ness management expertise. She has held positions in R&D 
research, R&D management, and in business leadership 
as Product Manager and Business Manager in established 
businesses and in commercialization of new products. 
Dr. Zahradnik also currently represents DuPont on the Mate-
rials Technical Advisory Committee at Commerce. 
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The National Academies’ BCST exists as the oversight 
group that ensures the highest quality scientific and techni-
cal advice is being provided to our Nation’s decision makers 
from experts in chemistry and chemical engineering. BCST 
is a forum through which the chemistry and chemical engi-
neering communities can give back to society, demonstrate 
the broader impact of their expertise, and help address critical 
societal problems. Its mission statement calls for BCST to 
assure that our Nation’s decision makers receive the highest 
quality scientific and technical advice from experts in chem-
istry and chemical engineering. 
BCST committees are currently active in four areas:
•	 Chemical and Energy Industries. This area is focused 
on issues that directly affect the chemical and energy 
industries, such as process safety, sustainable chem-
istry, and globalization of the chemical enterprise. 
Recent activities in this area include a study exam-
ining the design and evaluation of safer chemical 
substitutes and an upcoming study on the effects of 
diluted bitumen on the environment.
•	 National and Homeland Security. This area addresses 
safe and secure use of chemicals and responds to 
needs relating to homeland and national security. 
BCST committees have provided both the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Department of Homeland 
Appendix E
The Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology
Security with advice related to chemical and bio-
logical defense, sensor technology, and explosives 
detection. Recent work includes an examination of 
core capabilities for research and development in 
chemical and biological defense on behalf of the 
Department of Defense, as well as the workshop 
summarized here.
•	 Education and Workforce. This area of focus seeks 
to assure that the training and education of chemists 
and chemical engineers continues to prepare them for 
successful careers in the global chemical enterprise. 
It also addresses questions relating to current and 
emerging workforce needs and dynamics. Recent 
work includes a study on communicating chemistry 
in informal environments and another study examin-
ing the culture of safety in academic laboratories.
•	 Basic Research. This area focuses on questions 
related to technical developments in chemistry and 
chemical engineering, factors that support a strong 
chemical research infrastructure to support societal 
needs, and research-related road-mapping and pro-
gram reviews. Recent work in this area includes a 
study on current and future research opportunities in 
the glycosciences and a current study on the indus-
trialization of biology.
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